25 Years of Feminist Empiricism and Standpoint Theory: Where Are We Now?

Abstract

Over the past twenty-five years, numerous articles in Hypatia have clarified, revised, and defended increasingly more nuanced views of both feminist empiricism and standpoint feminism. Feminist empiricists have argued that scientific knowledge is contextual and socially situated (Longino 1990; Nelson 1990; Anderson 1995), and standpoint feminists have begun to endorse virtues of theory choice that have been traditionally empiricist (Wylie 2003). In fact, it is unclear whether substantive differences remain. I demonstrate that current versions of feminist empiricism and standpoint feminism now have much in common but that key differences remain. Specifically, they make competing claims about what is required for increasing scientific objectivity. They disagree about 1) the kind of diversity within scientific communities that is epistemically beneficial and 2) the role that ethical and political values can play. In these two respects, feminist empiricists have much to gain from the resources provided by standpoint theory. As a result, the views would be best merged into “feminist standpoint empiricism.”

“Girl Power”: Gendered Academic and Workplace Experiences of College Women in Engineering

“…Feminist standpoint theory uses the experiences of women to create knowledge and present critical reflections about how power dynamics shape social locations (Intemann 2010). Two important aspects of feminist standpoint theory are: (1) Social locations place limits on knowledge (e.g., some individuals may not have access to knowledge due to their position in society); and (2) standpoints for marginalized groups are disadvantaged (e.g., not well understood or heard by majority groups).…”

Trustworthiness and Truth: The Epistemic Pitfalls of Internet Accountability

“…Feminist empiricist epistemologists have long argued that critical dialogue within diverse epistemic communities facilitates the uncovering and removal of bias (e.g., Longino 1990Longino , 2002Anderson 1995;Intemann 2010). In scientific communities, diversity is epistemically valuable because biased background assumptions can be uncovered when research is subjected to conceptual and evidential criticism from scientists with diverse values, interests, and social identities.…”

Pragmatism and Embodiment as Resources for Feminist Interventions in Science

“…As I mentioned at the beginning of the paper, Wylie's work draws from the standpoint tradition. Kristin Intemann argues persuasively that the feminist empiricist and standpoint positions, at least in their most recent incarnations, are so similar as to be almost indistinguishable (Intemann 2010). However she identifies a commitment to embodiment as a lingering difference between the two-a commitment that, she argues, favours standpoint theory-and so I'll spend some time discussing the debate by way of illustrating my thesis.…”