33-month-old children succeed in a false belief task with reduced processing demands: A replication of Setoh et al. (2016)

Grosso, Stella S.; Schuwerk, Tobias; Kaltefleiter, Larissa J.; Sodian, Beate

doi:10.1016/j.infbeh.2018.09.012

Cited by 22 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Apperly & Butterfill, 2009). Such targeted examinations may reveal stronger relations between similar tasks, although recent work does suggest that even similar implicit measures do not correlate (Kulke et al, 2018;Grosso et al, 2019;Poulin-Dubois & Yott, 2018;Powell et al, 2018).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Minimal coherence among varied theory of mind measures in childhood and adulthood

Warnell¹,

Redcay²

2019

Preprint

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Theory of mind-or the understanding that others have mental states that can differ from one's own and reality-is currently measured across the lifespan by a wide array of tasks. These tasks vary across dimensions including modality, complexity, affective content, and whether responses are explicit or implicit. As a result, theoretical and meta-analytic work has begun to question whether such varied approaches to theory of mind should be categorized as capturing a single construct. To directly address the coherence of theory of mind, and to determine whether that coherence changes across development, we administered a diverse set of theory of mind measures to three different samples: preschoolers, schoolaged children, and adults. All tasks showed wide variability in performance, indicating that children and adults often have inconsistent and partial mastery of theory of mind concepts. Further, for all ages studied, the selected theory of mind tasks showed minimal correlations with each other. That is, having high levels of theory of mind on one task did not predict performance on another task designed to measure the same underlying ability. In addition to showing the importance of more carefully designing and selecting theory of mind measures, these findings also suggest that understanding others' internal states may be a multidimensional process that interacts with other abilities, a process which may not occur in a single conceptual framework. Future research should systematically investigate task coherence via large-scale and longitudinal efforts to determine how we come to understand the minds of others.3

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Minimal coherence among varied theory of mind measures in childhood and adulthood

Warnell¹,

Redcay²

2019

Preprint

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“…In typical development, ToM emerges through a natural progression of stages. By 4-5 years of age, typically developing children can easily pass traditional "first-order" ToM tasks [Korkmaz, 2011;Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001], and toddlers as young as 33 months can pass simplified versions of these tasks [Grosso, Schuwerk, Kaltefleiter, & Sodian, 2019;Setoh, Scott, & Baillargeon, 2016]. Such tasks require individuals to predict the actions or thoughts of another person based on a false belief.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cognitive processes predicting advanced theory of mind in the broader autism phenotype

et al. 2019

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Little is known about executive functions (EFs) associated with advanced theory of mind (ToM) abilities. We aimed to determine if advanced ToM abilities were reduced in individuals with subclinical traits of autism spectrum disorder (ASD), known as the “Broader Autism Phenotype” (BAP), and identify the EFs that predicted unimpaired performance on an advanced ToM task, the faux pas test. We assessed 29 participants (13 males) with the BAP who were relatives of children with ASD. Thirteen participants showed reduced ability to understand a faux pas. A discriminant function analysis correctly classified 79% of cases as impaired or unimpaired, with high sensitivity (80%) and specificity (77%), which was best predicted by language‐mediated EFs, including verbal generativity, working memory, cognitive inhibition, and flexibility. Autism Res 2020, 13: 921‐934. © 2019 International Society for Autism Research, Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Lay Summary Little is known about the complex cognitive processes that enable accurate interpretation of another person's thoughts and emotions, known as “theory of mind.” In relatives of individuals with autism, who had mild traits of autism themselves, approximately half had difficulty interpreting situations involving a social faux pas. Cognitive inhibition and flexibility, working memory, and verbal generativity were related to, and appeared to be protective for, unimpaired understanding of a faux pas.

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“…A nativist perspective regarding understanding others' mental states (Baillargeon, Scott, & Bian, 2016) predicts that children should succeed at traditional false-belief tasks (FBTs, Wimmer & Perner, 1983) before the age of 4 if their processing demands are appropriately reduced. To test this hypothesis, Setoh, Scott, and Baillargeon (2016; see also Grosso, Schuwerk, Kaltefleiter, & Sodian, 2019) presented toddlers with a modified low-processing demand task (LPDT), in which a fictional character, Emma, finds an apple in a bowl, moves it to a lidded box, and then leaves the room. While she is away, her brother, Ethan, finds the apple and takes it away.…”

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confidence: 99%

An Associationist Bias Explains Different Processing Demands for Toddlers in Different Traditional False-Belief Tasks

Fenici

Garofoli

2020

Human Development

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33-month-old children succeed in a false belief task with reduced processing demands: A replication of Setoh et al. (2016)

Cited by 22 publications

References 15 publications

Minimal coherence among varied theory of mind measures in childhood and adulthood

Minimal coherence among varied theory of mind measures in childhood and adulthood

Cognitive processes predicting advanced theory of mind in the broader autism phenotype

An Associationist Bias Explains Different Processing Demands for Toddlers in Different Traditional False-Belief Tasks

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