“…The discipline of economics can contribute here with the identification, study and review of institutional arrangements that have the potential of solving opportunism games in which also the principal defects by shaping the payoff structure in suitable ways. These include but are not limited to, institutions that fulfill one or more of the following purposes: - Enhance the transparency to lower transactions costs of using the market mechanism and to optimize firm‐specific investments of human capital, like for example online rating platforms for employers (DeKay, ; Symitsi et al, ),
- enhance the transparency to lower transaction costs and reduce power asymmetries within hierarchies like for example human resource management systems that include 360‐degree feedback processes (Bracken et al, ; Morgan et al, ) or agile management approaches (Abrahamsson et al, ; Jalali, and Wohlin, ; Sutherland, ),
- enforce and develop property rights not only of principals but also of agents, for example with a corresponding corporate culture (Collins, ; Schein, ), or specific approaches to leadership and management like autonomy enhancing paternalism (Binder and Lades, ).
- redefine property rights within the organization to reduce power asymmetries and increase participation of agents in decision‐making processes, for example with participatory approaches in the tradition of “New Work” (Bergmann, ; Laloux, ), with approaches to democratic corporate design (Boes et al, ), or with maturing institutions of traditional codetermination (Jirjahn et al, ),
- redefine property rights within and from outside the organization to protect agents from principal opportunism, for example through policies and legislation addressing workplace abuse (Duffy, , Wewers, ).
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