5. The legacy of Clausewitz

Clausewitzian Friction and Future War Revised Edition

“…From the emergence of modern standing armies during the period 1560-1660 32 to the French Revolution in 1789, European wars had been fought mostly for the aims of the monarch by professional armies whose officers were drawn from the nobility while their ranks were filled with conscripted peasants, press-ganged "volunteers," or mercenaries. 33 In the "diplomatic type of warfare" that came to dominate the pre-1789 era, the aggressor's usual plan was to seize an enemy province or two during the summer campaign season while the defender tried to prevent him from doing so; no battle was ever sought, or fought, unless it served to further the moderate or limited ends of one side or the other within the European balance of power; and such wars, being primarily the concern of the government, were estranged from the interests of the people. 34 When battles were waged, the focus of prerevolutionary armies on delivering the greatest possible concentration of firepower "produced linear tactics-the deployment of troops in long, thin lines blazing away at each other at point-blank range-which turned pitched battles into murderous setpieces that commanders of expensive regular forces avoided if they possibly could."…”

“…34 When battles were waged, the focus of prerevolutionary armies on delivering the greatest possible concentration of firepower "produced linear tactics-the deployment of troops in long, thin lines blazing away at each other at point-blank range-which turned pitched battles into murderous setpieces that commanders of expensive regular forces avoided if they possibly could." 35 Beginning in 1793, though, this age of diplomatic wars waged by professional armies for limited ends came to an abrupt end with the emergence of the French nation-in-arms. 36 As Clausewitz wrote:…”

“…forces could not only hold their own against the professional soldiers of the European powers but actually defeat them? 39 In response, Scharnhorst took full note of the advantages in strategic position, numbers, unified political and military command, and incentive that France had enjoyed over the allies of the First Coalition; he also delineated with objectivity and precision the superior effectiveness of French organization and tactics. 40 But beyond these military considerations he discerned a deeper reason for French success: the greater strength possessed by a freer nation, a condition that was closely connected with the transformation of French society stemming from the revolution and the emergence of the idea of nationhood.…”

“…And to these hordes of self-sacrificing infantry Bonaparte was to add artillery in ever increasing proportions, and cavalry trained in merciless pursuit. 43 The upshot of Scharnhorst's analysis of the deeper reasons for French success, first published in 1797, was clear recognition of a revolution in military affairs driven primarily by social and political changes. Granted, as Jean Colin argued in 1900, this revolution was not without CLARITY ABOUT WAR any technological component: the latter half of the 18 th century saw improvements in artillery, road building, and cartography that undoubtedly abetted the rise of a new kind of warfare after 1789.…”

“…But "was it possible to create a Nation except, as the French had done, by the overthrow of monarchical institutions and the creation of a plebiscitary dictatorship ruling by terror?" 46 Scharnhorst's solution was to propose the modernization of Hanover's military institutions. He advocated better education of commissioned and noncommissioned officers, promotion to lieutenant by examination, the abolition of nepotism and favoritism, more sensible application of military justice, expansion and reequipment of the artillery, transformation of infantry tactics along French lines, institution of a permanent general staff, reorganization of the army into all-arms divisions, and the introduction of conscription to diminish the mercenary character of the army.…”