5G-Enabled Defence-in-Depth for Multi-domain Operations

Abstract

In many civil and military use cases, 5G can be a segment of a more complex end-to-end solution. In such a configuration, properly using the 5G security mechanisms to achieve defence-in-depth and compliance with zero-trust architecture is challenging. In our paper, we discuss the existing 5G security mechanisms related to the connection of trusted and untrusted non-3GPP access networks (wireless and wired), 5G roaming, and the 3GPP approach to support Uncrewed Aerial Services, which provides authentication between the mobile terminal and an external server. The identified use cases show the need and opportunities for reusing 5G security mechanisms beyond the 5G network domain. We discuss the options for end-to-end defencein-depth security provisioning in multi-domain networks, and we present two approaches to providing end-to-end defence-in-depth mechanisms. The first relies on the alignment of security policies in multiple domains and is based on security proxies. The second is based on the multi-domain network slices.

Multi-Process Federated Learning With Stacking for Securing 6G-V2X Network Slicing at Cross-Borders

“…In the second phase, attacks can exploit misconfigurations and information gained from system infiltration, such as the maximum number of sessions supported by V-UPF and the activation of security controls to launch the attacks. To this end, our adversary model includes attacks targeting the data plane, such as attacks that aim to break V-UPF, H-UPF, and GTP-U data traffic passing through the N9 reference point (between H-UPF and V-UPF) [23], or GTP-C passing through the N4 reference point (between H-SMF and H-UPF) [24] or even the N6 reference point between 6G-V2X application and H-UPF [25]. These can critically impact 6G-V2X services such as MEC-assisted services and applications.…”

Reinforcement Learning-Based Security Orchestration for 5G-V2X Network Slicing at Cross-Borders

“…Consequently, V-MNO should promptly allocate for CAVs a 5G-V2X-NS with features similar to that the H-MNO uses. However, this may result in several vulnerabilities, such as non-timely synchronization of security policies and misconfigurations on both the H-MNO and V-MNO sides, which could be exploited to launch attacks on the data plane [5][6][7]. In addition to 5G security solutions, other security services should be deployed to prevent, detect, and mitigate 5G-V2X NS attacks at cross borders.…”

“…According to Equation (6), the total sum of selected security services' resources for a given 5G-V2X-NS i should not exceed the maximum available resources Γ max in i. Also, Equation (7) indicates that the total sum of tolerable impact of selected security services for 5G-V2X-NS i should not exceed the maximum tolerable impact Λ max on i. m j=1 (x j * Γ(sr j )) ≤ Γmax, x j = 0, 1, 2, 3, ..l;…”

“…However, 5G-V2X NS at cross-border is facing several security issues, leading to road hazards and threatening users' lives [4]. Specifically, attackers can exploit the lack of synchronization between the security policies of the H-MNO and the V-MNO, misconfigurations, and information obtained from system infiltration to target the data plane related to CAVs [5][6][7]. Several intelligent security services have recently been proposed to detect and mitigate attacks in 5G-V2X network slicing [8,9].…”