A 0.65-to-1.4nJ/burst 3-to-10GHz UWB Digital TX in 90nm CMOS for IEEE 802.15.4a

Ryckaert, Julien; Plas, G. Van der; Heyn, V. De; Desset, Claude; Vanwijnsberghe, G.; Poucke, B. Van; Craninckx, Jan

doi:10.1109/isscc.2007.373617

Cited by 33 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…Comparison is done along the line of dynamic power, leakage power, and output voltage swing. In some of the designs the leak- age power is obscured by operating in burst mode, thereby having a high effective pulse rate [12,19,20]. While comparing such designs we have taken care to use equivalent pulse rates.…”

Section: Antenna Driver Circuitmentioning

confidence: 99%

Low Power Impulse Radio Transceivers

Apsel

Wang

Dokania

2013

Analog Circuits and Signal Processing

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Section: Antenna Driver Circuitmentioning

confidence: 99%

Low Power Impulse Radio Transceivers

Apsel

Wang

Dokania

2013

Analog Circuits and Signal Processing

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“…The choice of transmitter is of little consequence to our investigation, any standard-compliant transmitter is acceptable, e.g., [19], [20]. We consider two types of receivers: a low-complexity and low-cost non-coherent energy-detection receiver, and a sophisticated coherent rake receiver.…”

Section: B Wireless Transceiversmentioning

confidence: 99%

Distance Bounding with IEEE 802.15.4a: Attacks and Countermeasures

Poturalski

Flury

Papadimitratos

et al. 2011

IEEE Trans. Wireless Commun.

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Impulse Radio Ultra-Wideband, in particular the recent standard IEEE 802.15.4a, is a primary candidate for implementing distance bounding protocols, thanks to its ability to perform accurate indoor ranging. Distance bounding protocols allow two wireless devices to securely estimate the distance between themselves, with the guarantee that the estimate is an upper-bound on the actual distance.These protocols serve as building blocks in security-sensitive applications such as tracking, physical access control, or localization.We investigate the resilience of IEEE 802.15.4a to physical-communication-layer attacks that decrease the distance measured by distance bounding protocols, thus violating their security. We consider two attack types: malicious prover (internal) and distance-decreasing relay (external). We show that if the honest devices use energy-detection receivers (popular due to their low cost and complexity), then an adversary can perform highly effective internal and external attacks, decreasing the distance by hundreds of meters. However, by using more sophisticated rake receivers, or by implementing small modifications to IEEE 802.15.4a and employing energy-detection receivers with a simple countermeasure, honest devices can reduce the effectiveness of external distance-decreasing relay attacks to the order of 10m.The effectiveness of malicious prover can also be reduced to 10m, by an additional modification to IEEE 802.15.4a along with the same simple countermeasure for both energy-detection receivers and rake receivers.

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“…The choice of transmitter is of little consequence to our investigation, any standard-compliant transmitter is acceptable [26,27]. The architecture of the receiver used by honest devices is described in Section 2.3.…”

Section: System Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Effectiveness of distance-decreasing attacks against impulse radio ranging

Flury

Poturalski

Papadimitratos

et al. 2010

Proceedings of the Third ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security

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We expose the vulnerability of an emerging wireless ranging technology, impulse radio ultra-wide band (IR-UWB), to distance-decreasing attacks on the physical communication layer (PHY). These attacks violate the security of secure ranging protocols that allow two wireless devices to securely estimate the distance between them, with the guarantee that the estimate is an upper-bound on the actual distance. Such protocols serve as crucial building blocks in security-sensitive applications such as location tracking, physical access control, or localization.Prior works show the theoretical possibility of PHY attacks bypassing cryptographic mechanisms used by secure ranging protocols. They also demonstrates that for physical layers used in ISO 14443 RFID and wireless sensor networks, some PHY attacks are indeed feasible. IR-UWB was proposed as a possible solution, but we show that the de facto standard for IR-UWB, IEEE 802.15.4a, does not automatically provide security against such attacks. We find that with the mandatory modes of the standard an external attacker can decrease the measured distance by as much as 140 meters with a high probability (above 99%).

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A 0.65-to-1.4nJ/burst 3-to-10GHz UWB Digital TX in 90nm CMOS for IEEE 802.15.4a

Cited by 33 publications

References 3 publications

Low Power Impulse Radio Transceivers

Low Power Impulse Radio Transceivers

Distance Bounding with IEEE 802.15.4a: Attacks and Countermeasures

Effectiveness of distance-decreasing attacks against impulse radio ranging

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