A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice

Banks, Jeffrey S.; Duggan, John

doi:10.2307/2586381

Cited by 311 publications

(309 citation statements)

References 61 publications

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“…He shows that the veto player's share of power is increasing as the cost of delaying an agreement decreases, so that non-veto members' shares decline to zero as the cost of delay becomes negligible. Banks and Duggan (2000) derive a related result in a more general model of collective decision making. Other papers build on more specific environments, focusing primarily on the case of presidential veto (see, for example, Myerson 1999, andMcCarty 2000).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

Veto power in committees: an experimental study

2010

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Veto power consists of the right of one or more players to unilaterally block decisions but without the ability to unilaterally secure their preferred outcome. Our experiment shows that (i) committees with a veto player take longer to reach decisions (are less efficient) and generate less consensus than without a veto player, (ii) veto power substantially enhances proposer's power, and (iii) non-veto players are substantially more willing to compromise than veto players. We relate our results to the theoretical literature on the impact of veto power as well as to concerns about the impact of veto power in real-life committees.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 95%

Veto power in committees: an experimental study

2010

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“…Similar extensions are allowed in Banks and Duggan (2000), Eraslan (2002) and Eraslan and McLennan (2013): all bargaining models with a fixed default. 2 the first two questions.…”

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confidence: 99%

Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default: Figure 1

Anesi

Seidmann

2015

Review of Economic Studies

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Committee voting has mostly been investigated from the perspective of the standard Baron-Ferejohn model of bargaining over the division of a pie, in which bargaining ends as soon as the committee reaches an agreement. In standing committees, however, existing agreements can be amended. This paper studies an extension of the Baron-Ferejohn framework to a model with an evolving default that reflects this important feature of policymaking in standing committees: In each of an infinite number of periods, the ongoing default can be amended to a new policy (which is, in turn, the default for the next period). The model provides a number of quite different predictions. (i) From a positive perspective, the key distinction turns on whether the quota is less than unanimity. In that case, patient enough players waste substantial shares of the pie each period and the size principle fails in some pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria. By contrast, the unique Markov perfect equilibrium payoffs in a unanimity committee coincide with those in the corresponding Baron-Ferejohn framework. (ii) If players have heterogeneous discount factors then a large class of subgame perfect equilibria (including all Markov perfect equilibria) are inefficient.JEL classification: C73, C78, D71, D72.

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“…Assume that D is monotonic (C ∈ D and C ⊆ C imply C ∈ D) and proper (C ∈ D implies N\C D). The class of voting rules permitted by these assumptions is similar to that in Banks and Duggan (2000) and Kalandrakis (2006) and subsumes all supermajority rules, weighted supermajority rules, certain bicameral voting rules, and many others.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 95%

Expert advice to a voting body

Schnakenberg

2015

Journal of Economic Theory

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I provide a theory of information transmission in collective choice settings. In the model, an expert has private information on the effect of a policy proposal and communicates to a set of voters prior to a vote over whether or not to implement the proposal. In contrast to previous game-theoretic models of political communication, the results apply to situations involving multiple voters, multidimensional policy spaces and a broad class of voting rules. The results highlight how experts can use information to manipulate collective choices in a way that reduces the ex ante expected utilities of all voters. Opportunities for expert manipulation are the result of collective choice instability: all voting rules that allow collective preference cycles also allow welfare-reducing manipulative persuasion by an expert. The results challenge prevailing theories of institutions in which procedures are designed to maximize information transmission.

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A Bargaining Model of Collective Choice

Cited by 311 publications

References 61 publications

Veto power in committees: an experimental study

Veto power in committees: an experimental study

Bargaining in Standing Committees with an Endogenous Default: Figure 1

Expert advice to a voting body

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