A bioeconomic analysis of bushmeat hunting

Abstract

Unsustainable bushmeat hunting is a major threat to mammal species, particularly in West/Central Africa. We developed a multispecies dynamic simulation model of hunter behaviour, parameterized using data from the Ashanti region, Ghana. The model distinguishes between two hunting techniques, snaring and gun hunting. We analyse the impact of key economic parameters on off-takes. Economic incentives determine the effort devoted to hunting, the choice of hunting technique, and the species that are consumed domestically or traded in markets. These factors, together with the growth rates and catchabilities of hunted species, determine the ecological impact of hunting. The results suggest that increased bushmeat prices are likely to lead to a switch from snaring, which is cheaper but less efficient, to gun hunting, with a consequent impact on vulnerable species. Increases in agricultural prices have an ambiguous effect on hunter behaviour, depending on the balance between incentives to invest in agriculture and increased consumption as incomes improve. Penalties are more effective if they target bushmeat sales, rather than the act of hunting. This model represents a step forward because it explicitly considers bushmeat as a component of the household economy. This has important implications as regards the development of policies to conserve species hunted for bushmeat.

The role of bushmeat in a West African agricultural landscape

“…Creating more employment opportunities in rural areas is thought to decrease dependence on forest resources in two ways: (1) by increasing the opportunity cost of forest resource extraction, hence reducing forest extraction activities, and (2) by increasing household wealth (Illukpitiya & Yanagida, 2010). Other factors may also be at play, including higher bushmeat prices, which would make hunting a more attractive livelihood option (Damania et al, 2005).…”

Modelling the effect of individual strategic behaviour on community-level outcomes of conservation interventions

“…Previous studies examining the enforcement of resourceuse rules have tended to concentrate on the users' incentives (for example fishers or poachers; Leader-Williams & MilnerGulland 1993;Skonhoft & Solstad 1996;Damania et al 2005). However, the success of enforcement also depends crucially on monitors' incentives to carry out their duties (Mookherjee & Png 1995;Mesterton-Gibbons & Milner-Gulland 1998;Robinson et al 2010).…”

“…Other forms of heterogeneity may produce similar effects. For example, decisions about whether to poach might vary according to an individual's opportunity costs (Damania et al 2005), with those who are able to find regular paid employment potentially facing lesser incentives to hunt (Muchaal & Ngandjui 1999), or according to differences in their ability to avoid detection and capture by enforcement agents (Malik 1990).…”

Cacería de subsistencia de distintos grupos indígenas de la Amazonía ecuatoriana

“…De manera que se ignoran los procesos humanos y se asume que las capturas son constantes. Los enfoques bioeconómicos superan estas limitaciones al integrar explícitamente a los componentes biológicos y humanos del sistema (Wilkie y Godoy 2001, Damania et al 2005, Ling y Milner-Gulland 2006, Siren et al 2006. A pesar de estas limitaciones, el modelo de producción utilizado es efectivo como una herramienta preliminar para medir el impacto en las poblaciones silvestres.…”