A black box assessment of institutional quality: the challenge of evaluating lobbying transparency

Laboutková, Šárka; Vymětal, Petr

doi:10.1080/01442872.2022.2053092

Cited by 5 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 69 publications

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“…The Global Data Barometer project highlights opportunities to improve both the content of information disclosed and the design of lobbyist registers to make them more accessible 19 . Effective enforcement and sanctions are likewise important to ensure compliance with transparency regulations 23,24 …”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Baby steps in lobbying reform: opportunities and challenges in Queensland

Lacy‐Nichols,

Cullerton

2023

Medical Journal of Australia

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Baby steps in lobbying reform: opportunities and challenges in Queensland

Lacy‐Nichols,

Cullerton

2023

Medical Journal of Australia

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Bridging energy transition and income inequality: The moderating effect of institutional transparency

Wang,

Yang,

2024

Sustainable Development

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The emergence of the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals has instigated a transformative phase in policy formulation, emphasizing the multifaceted approach required to attain these objectives. Central to this pursuit is the management of diverse goals and their intricate interactions. This paper rigorously examines the pivotal role of institutional transparency in the nexus between energy transition and income inequality across 127 countries from 2012 to 2020, within the framework of the Sustainable Development Goals. The estimated results from the non‐balanced panel threshold model suggest the existence of a threshold effect of institutional transparency in the impact of energy transition on income inequality. On the whole, the process of energy transition has had a detrimental effect on income inequality, with institutional transparency serving to moderate it. When institutional transparency falls within the first regime (lnCPI ≤3.3322), the second regime (3.3322 < lnCPI <4.3041), and the third regime (lnCPI >4.3041), a 1% increase in the proportion of renewable energy consumption results in average increases in disposable income inequality of 0.0165%, 0.0143%, and 0.0128%, respectively. This suggests that institutional transparency has a positive moderating effect on the detrimental impact of energy transition on disposable income inequality. However, this result does not hold true for market income inequality. Additionally, there is an “inverted U‐shaped” relationship between economic growth and income inequality, indicating the negative impact of energy transition on income inequality would be offset by its contribution to economic growth.

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Regulating legislative lobbying in Switzerland: superfluous or overdue?

Ammann

2024

Int Groups Adv

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Compared to global lobbying hubs like the USA and the European Union and to its neighboring countries, Switzerland hardly regulates legislative lobbying, i.e., lobbying that targets the legislative branch. Only three types of legal provisions apply to lobbying in the Swiss legislature: First, legislators must disclose their ties to interest groups. Second, access to the parliamentary building is limited and granted at the discretion of each legislator, who may give an entry pass to two individuals of his or her choice. Third, legislative lobbying is illegal if it violates the criminal law provisions on bribery. Proposals to enact more comprehensive regulation have failed, often after several years of legislative debate. Pursuant to the classification proposed by Chari et al. (Regulating Lobbying: A Global Comparison, 2nd ed., Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2019), the Swiss legal framework governing legislative lobbying qualifies as a ‘low-robustness’ regime at best. Yet, Switzerland ranks high in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (6/180 in 2023). Is more extensive regulation superfluous or overdue in Switzerland? While the Swiss legal and political order is exceptional in some respects, these characteristics do not justify ‘Swiss exceptionalism’ with regard to the regulation of legislative lobbying, as some of these specificities pose distinctive threats that the law needs to tackle.

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A black box assessment of institutional quality: the challenge of evaluating lobbying transparency

Cited by 5 publications

References 69 publications

Baby steps in lobbying reform: opportunities and challenges in Queensland

Baby steps in lobbying reform: opportunities and challenges in Queensland

Bridging energy transition and income inequality: The moderating effect of institutional transparency

Regulating legislative lobbying in Switzerland: superfluous or overdue?

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