A Bottom‐Up Theory of Public Opinion about Foreign Policy

Abstract

If public opinion about foreign policy is such an elite-driven process, why does the public often disagree with what elites have to say? We argue here that elite cue-taking models in International Relations are both overly pessimistic and unnecessarily restrictive. Members of the public may lack information about the world around them, but they do not lack principles, and information need not only cascade from the top down. We present the results from five survey experiments where we show that cues from social peers are at least as strong as those from political elites. Our theory and results build on a growing number of findings that individuals are embedded in a social context that combines with their general orientations toward foreign policy in shaping responses toward the world around them. Thus, we suggest the public is perhaps better equipped for espousing judgments in foreign affairs than many of our top-down models claim. . Thanks to Kyle Dropp for his assistance with fielding Experiments 1-2. Kertzer acknowledges the support of the Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance. series of polls found that Democrats and Republicans in the public were divided. In a Pew poll conducted July 24-27, 60% of Republicans blamed Hamas for the violence, whereas Democrats were split, with 29% blaming Hamas, and 26% blaming Israel. A Gallup poll conducted July 22-23 detected a similar pattern: 65% of Republicans thought Israel's actions were justified, but Democrats were divided, as 31% backed the Israeli response, and 47% called it unjustified. This pattern-where political elites are united but the public is divided-is particularly interesting for political scientists because it violates the assumptions of a commonly held theory about public opinion, in which the public knows relatively little about foreign affairs and thus structures its beliefs by taking cues from trusted, partisan elites-a top-down process in which members of the public adeptly swallow whatever their preferred elite cue-givers feed them. Yet if the mass public knows so little and can only regurgitate carefully pureed talking points, why does it often disagree with what elites have to say? We argue here that partisan elite

Moral Hazard: German Public Opinion on the Greek Debt Crisis

“…We believe that it is more likely that particular frames work better with some people given their preexisting moral foundations. The public is not as malleable as many assume (Kertzer & Zeitzoff, ). The Bild Zeitung , given the moral concerns of its readers, could not have articulated a probailout campaign that stressed the economic harm that austerity caused for Greek pensioners and widowers because it would not have resonated with its populist audience.…”

Authoritarian Audiences, Rhetoric, and Propaganda in International Crises: Evidence from China

“…Our two survey experiments in China provide suggestive evidence of authoritarian audience costs and indicate that some government explanations can be effective in justifying inaction. However, researchers have also shown that democratic governments are able to control the domestic costs of inaction or backing down through elite cues, 49 while others have highlighted the importance of social peers (Kertzer and Zeitzoff, 2017). Further research may wish to explicitly compare the extent to which democratic and authoritarian governments can shape domestic reactions to crisis developments-as well as how these mass incentives are communicated and understood by foreign decision-makers.…”

World Citizens on the Periphery: Threat and Identification with Global Society

“…When juxtaposed with the large body of evidence showing that residents of strong states emphasize particularistic identities that encourage isolationist and xenophobic tendencies in response to acute threats (e.g., Feinstein 2016a), this presents an ironic dilemma: the reactions of residents of the same core states that largely constructed and continue to dominate the global order compose the greatest risk to its preservation. This circumstance suggests that individuals on the global periphery are less of a danger to the global order than residents of the global core; the latter are more likely to retreat to particularism under threat and have the power to alter their countries' foreign policies and relationships with the outside world (Kertzer and Zeitzoff 2017). Consider, for example, that residents of the United Kingdom, one of the world's most powerful countries, recently voted to leave the European Union, while residents of less powerful countries like Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia remain eager to join.…”