A Case for Ethical Veganism

Abstract

This paper argues for ethical veganism: the thesis that it is typically wrong to consume animal products. The paper first sets out an intuitive case for this thesis that begins with the intuitive claim that it is wrong to set fire to a c a t I then raise a methodological challenge: this is an intuitive argument for a revisionary conclusion. Even if we grant that we cannot both believe that it is permissible to drink milk, and that it is wrong to set fire to cats, this leaves open the question of which of these judgments we should abandon. I consider and reject three strategies for addressing this question: more methodologically naive moral theorizing, appeal to systematic normative theory, and attacking non-moral presuppositions. I argue that philosophically satisfying the reso lution of the conflict requires debunking our grounds for belief in one of the conflict ing claims. Finally, I argue that ethical veganism is supported by consideration of the most salient debunking arguments available.

The Diner’s Defence: Producers, Consumers, and the Benefits of Existence

“…But it is not as wrong as committing a cruel prank. So even if ultimately, one of these other arguments is successful, the diner's defence might show that the actions of omnivores are less morally bad than we otherwise might think, and that we should be sceptical of the more extreme claims of moral vegetarians -that eating meat is as bad as torturing puppies, for example [Norcross 2004], or setting kittens on fire [McPherson 2014].…”

A Bayesian analysis of debunking arguments in ethics

“…20 Moreover, the formula for the debunked credence allows us to quantitatively estimate the impact of debunking, which can come in useful. First, some theorists argue that we should resolve conflicts of intuition by comparing the best debunking argument for each opposing intuition (McPherson, 2014) -this formula gives us a precise way of doing so. Second, the formula can estimate the joint impact of false positive more likely and true positive less likelythis represents an advance, since they are usually only considered separately (for instance, sensitivity-based debunking arguments are run separately from safety-based ones).…”