This chapter inquires whether Brazil's headways in Africa over recent years were organic in nature and in content or if, in fact, were achieved at the expenses of other previously established actors. By reframing Brazil's agenda towards African Lusophone countries in juxtaposition to the perceived external downturn of Portugal, the propitious context and consequences of a new player on the continent can be best brought into evidence. The pushand-pull forces enacted by both Brazil and Portugal towards Lusophone Africa are explored through the aftermath of the 2012 military coup in Guinea-Bissau and the adhesion of Equatorial-Guinea to the CPLP in 2014. The chapter offers a reinterpretation of Brazil's net gains in Africa and argues for its fragility and susceptibility to changing political-economic cycles.provide. This outcome further solidified a reverse of fortunes after a decade and half in which most observers would have had likely bet on an inverted dynamic.More strikingly, it came on the heels of an opportunity provided by a partner which Brazil had, witting or unwittingly, sought to circumvent in recent years. As Brazil significantly increased its profile in African Lusophone countries, it benefitted from an added erosion of Portuguese clout on the ground. Hence, and given the stark policy changes that have recently taken place in Brasília, this chapter inquires whether previously lauded headways towards Africa in the high-politics domain were indeed organic in nature and in content or if, in fact, were largely achieved at the expenses of other established actors. The geographic selection is set on where Brazil's priority has been more intense, whenever any wider African agenda was rolled out in contemporary history. This regional choice comes with one important caveat, i.e. inroads in the CAR will never be on the same plaining field as Brazil's track-record with, for example, Angola or Mozambique. Inferences that apply to the broader continent are therefore more difficult to extrapolate. That said, such clear-cut geographic preference still allows to explore the set of conditions that instilled Brazil's expanded profile in the first place.The core claim lies on the necessity to go against pre-established narratives of inevitability, that Brazil succeeded, succeeds or will succeed in Africa just because. A more critical approach is in need if the current debate is to move forward. I argue that Brazil has only been able to venture into Africa and will only do so once more whenever the right set of externally-driven conditions are in place. That includes not only taking advantage of unexpected opportunities but also in filling-in gaps made possible by other players competing for the same space of influence. In both cases, expansive cycles with corresponding material resources are paramount. Yet, if credible commitments are not dully provided across the Atlantic, any occasional upswing of the sort will invariably prove short-lived.Based on interviews, diplomatic cables 2 , and a review of previous literature, ...