A Case Study on Covert Channel Establishment via Software Caches in High-Assurance Computing Systems

Abstract

Covert channels can be utilized to secretly deliver information from high privileged processes to low privileged processes in the context of a high-assurance computing system. In this case study, we investigate the possibility of covert channel establishment via software caches in the context of a framework for component-based operating systems. While component-based operating systems offer security through the encapsulation of system service processes, complete isolation of these processes is not reasonably feasible. This limitation is practically demonstrated with our concept of a specific covert timing channel based on file system caching. The stability of the covert channel is evaluated and a methodology to disrupt the covert channel transmission is presented. While these kinds of attacks are not limited to high-assurance computing systems, our study practically demonstrates that even security-focused computing systems with a minimal trusted computing base are vulnerable for such kinds of attacks and careful design decisions are necessary for secure operating system architectures.

TurboCC: A Practical Frequency-Based Covert Channel With Intel Turbo Boost

“…For example, Brumley [7] and Schmidt et al [32] describe pollution of cache lines as a countermeasure against cache-based covert channels. We show that CPU load noise has a significant impact on the throughput of our covert channel and is therefore usable as a countermeasure.…”