A Centrality-Based Security Game for Multihop Networks

Abstract

Abstract-We formulate a network security problem as a zero-sum game between an attacker who tries to disrupt a network by disabling one or more nodes, and the nodes of the network who must allocate limited resources in defense of the network. The utility of the zero-sum game can be one of several network performance metrics that correspond to node centrality measures. We first present a fast centralized algorithm that uses a monotone property of the utility function to compute saddle-point equilibrium strategies for the case of single-node attacks and single-or multiple-node defense. We then extend the approach to the distributed setting by computing the necessary quantities using a finite-time distributed averaging algorithm. For simultaneous attacks to multiple nodes the computational complexity becomes quite high, so we propose a method to approximate the saddle-point equilibrium strategies based on a sequential simplification, which performs well in simulations.

Power maximisation technique for generating secret keys by exploiting physical layer security in wireless communication

“…Physical layer SKG techniques offer several advantages as compared to traditional SKG algorithms, for instance, Diffie–Hellman protocol [16]. For example, the physical layer SKG does not need any computationally bounded adversary as it is based on channel randomness.…”