A Certificate Infrastructure for Machine-Checked Proofs of Conditional Information Flow

Amtoft, Torben; Dodds, Josiah; Zhang, Zhi; Appel, Andrew W.; Beringer, Lennart; Hatcliff, John; Ou, Xinming; Cousino, Andrew

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-28641-4_20

Cited by 20 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…The following definition describes the construction of a CCV for a given CPA. 5 Modification which do not lead to certificates result in a syntactic rejection. Definition 5.…”

Section: Configurable Certificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this, our focus lays on generating certificates which can ease verification and thereby serve as witnesses for the correctness of a program. The aspect of small trusted bases, which is the idea of foundational proof carrying code [6], (so far) plays no role in our approach (in contrast to, for instance, the two security approaches [7,5]). Our generic approach builds on an existing framework for configurable program analysis with tool support in the form of CPAchecker [13].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Seen as a very general idea, this principle has already been in use for some time, namely in various forms of proof carrying code [22]: Code producers attach proofs to their code which should then be easily checkable by code consumers. Today ranging from areas as diverse as hardware [18] to security applications [7,5], all these techniques have in common that they target a specific type of property (most often memory or type safety [21,16]) and develop specific analysis techniques tailored towards proof/certificate generation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Certification for configurable program analysis

Jakobs

Wehrheim

2014

Proceedings of the 2014 International SPIN Symposium on Model Checking of Software

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Configurable program analysis (CPA) is a generic concept for the formalization of different software analysis techniques in a single framework. With the tool CPAchecker, this framework allows for an easy configuration and subsequent automatic execution of analysis procedures ranging from data-flow analysis to model checking. The focus of the tool CPAchecker is thus on analysis.In this paper, we study configurability from the point of view of software certification. Certification aims at providing (via a prior analysis) a certificate of correctness for a program which is (a) tamper-proof and (b) more efficient to check for validity than a full analysis. Here, we will show how, given an analysis instance of a CPA, to construct a corresponding sound certification instance, thereby arriving at configurable program certification. We report on experiments with certification based on different analysis techniques, and in particular explain which characteristics of an underlying analysis allow us to design an efficient (in the above (b) sense) certification procedure.

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“…The following definition describes the construction of a CCV for a given CPA. 5 Modification which do not lead to certificates result in a syntactic rejection. Definition 5.…”

Section: Configurable Certificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Certification for configurable program analysis

Jakobs

Wehrheim

2014

Proceedings of the 2014 International SPIN Symposium on Model Checking of Software

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“…The memory is modelled as a function from machine addresses to memory pages; contrary to separation kernels, pages are allocated on demand. Each page contains: .i an owner (PageOwner); .ii a flag indicating whether the page can be cached or not 6 ; .iii a content (PageContent). A page owner is either the hypervisor or a guest OS; pages may not have owners.…”

Section: Formalization Of Propositionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Barthe et al [15] and Amtoft et al [6] formally verify type-based and logic-based methods for enforcing information flow policies in programs. More recently, Azevedo et al [8] formally verify a clean-slate design that enforces information flow.…”

Section: Verified Compilation and Analyses Compcertmentioning

confidence: 99%

System-level Non-interference for Constant-time Cryptography

Barthe

Betarte

Campo

et al. 2014

Proceedings of the 2014 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

122

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Abstract. Cache-based attacks are a class of side-channel attacks that are particularly effective in virtualized or cloud-based environments, where they have been used to recover secret keys from cryptographic implementations. One common approach to thwart cache-based attacks is to use constant-time implementations, i.e. which do not branch on secrets and do not perform memory accesses that depend on secrets. However, there is no rigorous proof that constant-time implementations are protected against concurrent cache-attacks in virtualization platforms with shared cache; moreover, many prominent implementations are not constant-time. An alternative approach is to rely on system-level mechanisms. One recent such mechanism is stealth memory, which provisions a small amount of private cache for programs to carry potentially leaking computations securely. Stealth memory induces a weak form of constant-time, called S-constant-time, which encompasses some widely used cryptographic implementations. However, there is no rigorous analysis of stealth memory and S-constant-time, and no tool support for checking if applications are S-constant-time. We propose a new information-flow analysis that checks if an x86 application executes in constant-time, or in S-constant-time. Moreover, we prove that constant-time (resp. S-constant-time) programs do not leak confidential information through the cache to other operating systems executing concurrently on virtualization platforms (resp. platforms supporting stealth memory). The soundness proofs are based on new theorems of independent interest, including isolation theorems for virtualization platforms (resp. platforms supporting stealth memory), and proofs that constant-time implementations (resp. S-constant-time implementations) are non-interfering with respect to a strict information flow policy which disallows that control flow and memory accesses depend on secrets. We formalize our results using the Coq proof assistant and we demonstrate the effectiveness of our analyses on cryptographic implementations, including PolarSSL AES, DES and RC4, SHA256 and Salsa20.

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