A Characterization of Minimum Price Walrasian Rule in Object Allocation Problem for an Arbitrary Number of Objects

Abstract

We consider the multi-object allocation problem with monetary transfers where each agent obtains at most one object (unit-demand). We focus on allocation rules satisfying individual rationality, no subsidy, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Extending the result of Morimoto and Serizawa (2015), we show that for an arbitrary number of agents and objects, the minimum price Walrasian is characterized by the four properties on the classical domain.

A Characterization of the Minimum Price Walrasian Rule with Reserve Prices for an Arbitrary Number of Agents and Objects

“…Lemma 12 * plays an important role in Morimoto and Serizawa's (2015) proof of Proposition 4. 15 It implies that if Proposition 4 does not hold, then there is an allocation that Pareto-dominates the allocation of the rule satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency, individual rationality and no-subsidy for losers. Similar arguments are applied to derive contradictions in several points in their proofs.…”