A Church-Fitch proof for the universality of causation

Weaver, Christopher Gregory

doi:10.1007/s11229-012-0079-x

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 53 publications

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“…24 The proof leans heavily upon Church (2009), Fitch (1963, Kvanvig (2006, pp. 12-14), Oppy (2000), and Weaver (2013). Joe Salerno was the first to impress upon me the possibility of running a proof like this.…”

Section: The Justificationmentioning

confidence: 95%

Yet another new cosmological argument

Weaver

2015

Int J Philos Relig

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Section: The Justificationmentioning

confidence: 95%

Yet another new cosmological argument

Weaver

2015

Int J Philos Relig

Self Cite

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“…For if some causal relations seem to have a gap between their relata, we find ourselves demanding of them an explanation of why their effects occur when they do. This demand comes from the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), which requires an explanation of what it is about the causes in question that enables them to pass into non-existence for some duration and yet still bring about their effects (for recent defenses of the PSR, see Weaver 2013 andDasgupta 2016; for criticism, see Kleinschmidt 2013). Until we can confirm our hunch, our unconscious reliance on the PSR makes us assume that either the causes did not pass into non-existence after all or there were some undetected intermediaries that bridged the gap (Shoemaker 1969, p. 377).…”

Section: Preliminaries and Motivationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Russell and the Temporal Contiguity of Causes and Effects

Clay

2017

Erkenn

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Russell and the Temporal Contiguity of Causes and Effects forthcoming in Erkenntnis Graham Clay (corrected penultimate draft; please cite published version)There are some necessary conditions on causal relations that seem to be so trivial that they do not merit further inquiry. Many philosophers assume that the requirement that there could be no temporal gaps between causes and their effects is such a condition. Bertrand Russell disagrees. In this paper, an in-depth discussion of Russell's argument against this necessary condition is the centerpiece of an analysis of what is at stake when one accepts or denies that there can be temporal gaps between causes and effects. It is argued that whether one accepts or denies this condition, one is implicated in taking on substantial and wide-ranging philosophical positions. Therefore, it is not a trivial necessary condition of causal relations and it merits further inquiry.

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“…Pruss (, chapter 13), and Weaver () and (), have recently argued for a principle roughly along these lines, namely that all contingent events have causes.…”

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confidence: 99%

Metaphysical Rationalism

Dasgupta

2014

Nous

154

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The Principle of Sufficient Reason states that everything has an explanation. But different notions of explanation yield different versions of this principle. Here a version is formulated in terms of the notion of a "grounding" explanation. Its consequences are then explored, with particular emphasis on the fact that it implies necessitarianism, the view that every truth is necessarily true. Finally, the principle is defended from a number of objections, including objections to necessitarianism. The result is a defense of a "rationalist" metaphysics, one that constitutes an alternative to the contemporary dogmas that some aspects of the world are "metaphysically brute" and that the world could in so many ways have been different.Those who are ignorant of true causes, make complete confusion-think that trees might talk just as well as men-that men might be formed from stones as well as from seed . . .-B. Spinoza, Ethics, 1p8s2A metaphysical rationalist is someone who endorses the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR), the principle that everything has an explanation. The PSR can be understood in a number of different ways depending on the meaning of 'explanation' and the range of the quantifier 'everything', so metaphysical rationalists come in many different stripes. But every rationalist thinks that in some interesting sense there is an explanation (or "reason") for everything. Her rationalism is then qualified as being metaphysical to distinguish it from other rationalisms (such as epistemic rationalism, a thesis concerning the sources of justification) but this qualification can now be dropped for brevity.Although rationalism of one form or another was arguably embraced by such luminaries as Aquinas, Spinoza, and Leibniz (amongst others), it is fair to say that it has since largely fallen out of favor. Indeed my sense is that (with a few exceptions) contemporary philosophers tend to treat it as an antiquated view that need not be taken seriously today. 1 This may be the result of two factors. First, the PSR (in one form or another) is often thought to have consequences that might be thought problematic, including necessitarianism (the view that every truth is necessarily true), the existence of God, and indeed the existence of every conceivable being. 2 And second, there is a perceived lack of evidence in its favor. These two factors naturally lead to an attitude of (perhaps respectful) dismissal. C 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

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A Church-Fitch proof for the universality of causation

Cited by 5 publications

References 53 publications

Yet another new cosmological argument

Yet another new cosmological argument

Russell and the Temporal Contiguity of Causes and Effects

Metaphysical Rationalism

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