A CLASSIFICATION AND REVIEW OF COOPERATION PROCEDURES¹

Abstract

The definition of cooperation allows many procedural variations, as revealed by examination of the cooperation literature which includes procedures differing so greatly that it is surprising that all of them are considered under the same topic. This paper attempts to provide a framework for organizing that literature by (1) indicating some procedural dimensions along which cooperation procedures can be classified, (2) classifying and reviewing briefly the research at the extremes of these procedural dimensions, and (3) indicating the behavioral effects that are necessary to demonstrate control by the various cooperation procedures.

Why cooperate?An economic perspective is not enough

“…Their behavior, in other words, remains truly individual. In experiments limited to synchronizing individual operants, there is little difference between the results obtained with transparent or opaque partitions (Hake and Vukelich, 1972). And in PD games, animals consistently chose non-cooperation, revealing a strong bias towards the larger, immediate outcome associated with a preference for "non-cooperation" (Clements and Stephens, 1995;Flood et al, 1983;Green et al, 1995).…”

“…A precursor of such isolation models, in both method and theory, was offered by Skinner (1953) who argued from his individual-behavior perspective that the essence of cooperation was captured by reinforcing the synchronizing of simple responses such as a bar pressing or key pecking of two subjects isolated in separate chambers (for a review, Hake and Vukelich, 1972). By preserving the individual properties of both behavior and reinforcement, Skinner sought to extend the processes underlying individual learning to cooperation.…”

“…Subjects then had to respond to the operant behavior of their partner as the timing cue for executing their own responses. But in so-called "non-social cooperation" experiments (Hake and Vukelich, 1972), interaction was completely eliminated by opaque partitions. Synchronization became possible only if the behavior of one subject provided a non-social light or tone to the other subject that signaled the opportunity to gain reinforcement by responding.…”

“…For both experimental psychologists (Hake and Vukelich, 1972;Skinner, 1953;Weingarten and Mechner, 1966) and evolutionary biologists (Clements and Stephens, 1995;Dugatkin, 1997;Krebs and Davies, 1993;Mesterton-Gibbons and Dugatkin, 1992;Stephens and Anderson, 1997;Trivers, 1985), cooperation occurs when outcomes for an individual are dependent not only on its own behavior but also on the behavior of others. Outcomes are usually tangible and beneficial events such as gaining access to food, mates, mating sites or money.…”

Instruções e iniqüidade de reforços: efeitos sobre o comportamento competitivo

“…Nas situações sociais que têm como objetivo a execução de tarefas, tipos diversos de relações podem ser observados entre os indivídu-os participantes. Nas relações competitivas, a distribuição de reforços depende do desempenho relativo dos participantes de modo que os reforços obtidos por um participante são, pelo menos em parte, dependentes do comportamento de outro indivíduo (Hake & Vukelich, 1972;Schmitt, 1984, J. Abreu-Rodrigues & cols. cebia o reforço (VI competitivo), cuja magnitude era três vezes maior do que na alternativa individual. Os dados indicaram que quanto maior o número de perdas na contingên-cia competitiva (o que produzia iniqüidade desfavorável ao participante que estava perdendo), maior a preferência pela contingência individual (ver também Schmitt, 1998).…”