This study reports a simple experiment using induced-value items to assess the accuracy of the Becker, DeGroot, Marschak (BDM) method (1964 Behavioral Science) for measuring preferences. Although the BDM mechanism is incentive compatible the data indicate that it can be empirically unreliable due to susceptibility to subject misconceptions about the game form. The resulting choices appear to reflect preferences constructed through a framing process, but further analysis reveals types of misconceptions through specific patterns of behavior. The data are more consistent with a hypothesis that the choices represent mistakes, such as a misconception that the BDM is a first-price auction mechanism. This highlights that preferences should be considered as distinct from choices unless misconceptions are eliminated. Neglecting misconceptions and related mistakes can lead the theory of framing and the theory of revealed preference to result in incorrect interpretations of data.
Keywords: Preference Elicitation; Misconceptions; Reference Dependence; Endowment Effect
JEL codes: C8, C9For helpful comments we thank Gary Charness, Vincent Crawford, David Grether, David Levine, Vai-Lam Mui, Anmol Ratan, Matthew Shum, Charles Sprenger, Kathryn Zeiler, and presentation audiences at UC Santa Barbara, USC, Purdue, and ESA, and SAET conferences. We retain responsibility for our interpretation and for any mistakes or misconceptions. ‡ Economics Department, Krannert School of Management, Purdue University 100 S. Grant Street, West Lafayette, IN 47907-2076 While the BDM is a very powerful tool, inconsistencies of preference measurement across different versions of the method and other techniques for eliciting preferences suggest that the methodology itself should be examined. The reliability and use of the BDM is closely related to a fundamental controversy about the properties of preferences, which is the focus of this paper.The controversy has on the one hand the theory of revealed preference, which rests on the hypothesis that individuals have preferences over outcomes and those preferences are independent of the feasible set of outcomes. On the other hand, the theory of framing holds that preferences are dependent on and perhaps even constructed from the context faced by the individual and might have no particular existence outside that context.
1This study provides evidence that the widely-used BDM mechanism is a problematic measurement tool, leading to a reinterpretation of this controversy because many choices reflect mistakes rather than preferences.Any pattern of choices can be described as having been produced by some form of preference if the set of admissible preferences is sufficiently rich. For any choice, one can imagine a preference that could have produced it, suggesting that the theory of preference is not falsifiable. The theory of revealed preference was created to explore this issue. Over the decades, this theory has evolved to isolate various features of preference consistency together with tests that ca...