A comparison of measures of emotions from written reports of dreams and waking experiences

Abstract

In this study nine female university students wrote about their waking experiences for the four hour period prior to going to sleep during a two week period. On alternate mornings, these subjects either redescribed the prior evening's events or described any dreams they remembered. The procedures and formats for the evening and morning reports were as nearly equivalent as practical considerations allow.Two judges scored all reports for five classes of emotions defined by Hall and Van de Castle (1966). Interrater agreement was weak. The respective judges seemed to employ more or less stringent standards in identifying emotions. This fact notwithstanding, the ultimate findings, based on each judge's independent scores, point to the same conclusion.The results seem to contradict assertions that dreams exhibit fewer or more dysphoric emotions. Overall, reports of waking experiences and dreams contained the same frequencies and qualities Van de Castle, 1966;Snyder, 1970;Hartshorn, Corriere, Karle, Switzer, Hart, Gold, & Binder, 1977) and more unpleasant emotions (Calkins, 1893; Weed & Hallam, 1896;Bentley, 1915; Hall & Van de Castle, 1966;Snyder, 1970;Kramer, Winget, & Whitman, 1971) than they expected. These observations might imply that dream reports contain less emotions and more dysphoric emotions than would reports of waking experiences. However, the studies cited did not evaluate waking reports.In this project five classes of emotions were scored for similar reports of dreams and waking experiences, and these measures were compared to see if they are different. In general, the results are inconsistent with the implications suggested above.As pref ace to describing the present research, the relationship between dreams and waking experience and some relevant additional empirical findings about dreaming and waking emotions are discussed.Theories of emotions and certain constraints which sleep physiology might impose on dream emotions are considered. Finally, methodological issues are identified. CHAPTER II THE COMPARISON OF DREAMS AND WAKING EXPERIENCE ASSUMPTION OF WAKING EXPERIENCE AS A BASELINEThe assumption of waking experience as "given" and as a baseline against which to compare dreams influences conceptualization of dreams and probably dream research. In this perspective, memories from sleep may be described as more bizarre, hallucinatory, symbolic, and less rational than waking experiences. The reasoning behind this assumption is usually tacit and merits examination. Maybe we employ wakeful experience as a baseline because it seems more "normal," is more easily remembered (see Domhoff, 1969;Cohen, 1974), or we feel that we understand it better. It could be that we do not use sleeping experience as a baseline because we almost always make comparisons of the two states when we are awake; were we to evaluate waking experience when asleep, that state might seem the more normal. In any event a point made by Foulkes and Fleisher (1975) is critical:[The] baseline properties of waking thought can no longer be ...