A comparison of the economic development policies of county, metropolitan and non-metropolitan district councils

Territorial Competition and the Predictability of Collective (In)Action*

“…However, since the degree of influence of rent-earners is likely to be (negatively) correlated with the strength of Labour representation on a local authority, some conclusions might be drawn from variations in the pattern of activity between councils controlled by left or right. In terms of the total level of activity and the range of the initiatives pursued, Armstrong and Izadi (1994) show a positive association with Labour representation, although they suggest that this might also reflect variations in unemployment, as a key motivating concern behind local economic policies. Within the London region, however, the survey of economic development plans points to a different contrast, between: county councils with relatively weak Labour representation, and a bias toward the more obviously competitive policies, focused on marketing and premises; and the London boroughs with significantly stronger Labour representation and a bias towards support policies for disadvantaged groups of residents (in the form of childcare to assist returning female workers, and vocational or IT training), rather than rent-earners.…”

“…There are notable examples of arrangements such as this in Birmingham and Sheffield as well as in continental Europe and such groupings are popping up all over southern England (cf. Armstrong and Izadi, 1994).…”

“…Within England and Waleswhich lacks significant independent economic institutions at a sub-national levelsurveys of local authority economic development policies and staffing provide quite good indications of the overall growth and balance of competitive activity. Following rapid growth in the first half of the 1980s, particularly in the more strategically oriented county councils and metropolitan districts, there is evidence of both a diffusion from disadvantaged urban areas to previously less active authorities (Mills and Young, 1986), and a broadening of the range of policies pursued (Sellgren, 1991;Bennett and Krebs, 1991;Armstrong and Izadi, 1994). In France the local Committees of Expansion increased the resources they devoted to attracting inward investment by 77% in the three years to 1991 (Benoit, 1995).…”

“…Alongside the direct activities in which virtually all local authorities are now engaged (Armstrong and Izadi, 1994), an increasing range of public-private organizations promoting economic development has been spawned since the late 1970s, including the Hampshire Development Association (Axford and Pinch, 1994), Swindon Enterprise (Bassett and Harloe, 1990), London FirstLondon Forum (Gordon, 1994) A survey by the authors showed that much the most common type of policy of the 70 local authorities in the GSE with published economic development plans was promotion and marketing. Two thirds of authorities reported that they were active here.…”

Does Government Performance Matter? The Effects of Local Government on Urban Outcomes in England

“…From the 1980s to the 2000s, elected local government in England has moved, at least in part, from being an institution of the welfare state to being more entrepreneurial in trying to shape the fortunes of cities (for example, Harding et al, 2000;Imrie et al, 1995;Ward, 1997). Local government activity in economic development expanded rapidly over the 1980s and early 1990s, covering financial assistance, sites and premises, advisory and information services and training initiatives (Armstrong and Izadi, 1994). Prominent cities, such as Leeds and Manchester, are cited as exemplars of how local democratic leadership can influence local economic and social conditions.…”