A complementarity model for the European natural gas market

Abstract

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Evidence of Market Power in the Atlantic Steam Coal Market Using Oligopoly Models with a Competitive Fringe

“…We find applications to the electricity market in Bushnell (2003) and Chen et al (2006). Another field where the CV approach has been used is in gas market modeling, for example by Zwart and Mulder (2006) and Egging et al (2008Egging et al ( , 2010. In the field of coal market modeling, which is the focus of the applied part of this paper, recent use of the CV approach was done by and .…”

“…Values higher than zero and up to 1 are also possible to model collusion and monopoly equilibria but we are more interested in non-cooperative market outcomes. Hence it is possible by setting the value of r i to any number between -1 and 0 to compute a range of equilibria that are thought to represent various degrees of competition or market power as stated for example by Egging et al (2008). In the following we evaluate this statement carefully as what seems to be an easy and straightforward way to deal with imperfect competition can lead to counter-intuitive and unsatisfactory results.…”

Analysis of the World Market for Steam Coal Using a Complementarity Model

“…Given the spatial character of the market and our earlier expertise on Cournot modeling of natural gas market (e.g. Holz et al [10] and Egging et al [3]) we concentrate on a spatial Cournot model. A general formulation of how the Takayama-Judge spatial equilibrium model can collapse into a spatial Cournot model can be found in the paper by Yang, Hwang and Sohng [22].…”

Shaking Dutch grounds won’t shatter the European gas market

“…It becomes apparent that not one country compensates the change in Dutch natural gas production, but instead many countries use their opportunity to increase their exports to Europe. This is due to the oligopolistic market structure which characterizes the European natural gas market where the high prices are attractive for large array of suppliers (see, e.g., Egging et al 2008. The import increase and the diversification from various sources secure the gas supply in Europe and prevent European countries from price spikes compared to the Base Case.…”