A Concept of Egalitarianism Under Participation Constraints

Group strategyproof cost sharing: The role of indifferences

“…The key restriction on prices is that for any two nodes to which the same agent is attached, the price on the winning node is not smaller than that on the losing node. 3 Surprisingly, the (welfarewise) intersection of sequential and cross-monotonic mechanisms is almost empty. It contains only the fixed cost mechanisms (Corollary 1), offering to each agent a price completely independent of the reports.…”

The complexity of egalitarian mechanisms for linear programming games

“…Egalitarian mechanisms [2] were inspired by an algorithmic idea for egalitarian allocations in convex cooperative games originally proposed by Dutta and Ray [8]. Roughly speaking, at every iteration, an egalitarian mechanism finds the most "cost efficient" subset of players that have not yet been assigned a price, and assigns each of these players their collective average marginal cost as its price.…”

“…The equal split-off set [3] of a subadditive cooperative game (N, c) is the set of all cost allocations that can be computed by the following algorithm, again, inspired by the algorithm of Dutta and Ray [8]. (Note that Branzei et al [3] define the equal split-off set for superadditive reward cooperative games.…”

“…Mehta et al [17] proposed a generalization of Moulin mechanisms called acyclic mechanisms and showed that these mechanisms are weakly group strategyproof. Bleischwitz et al [2] introduced egalitarian mechanisms, inspired by the work of Dutta and Ray [8], and showed that these mechanisms are budget balanced, approximately efficient, and group strategyproof against service-aware players.…”

A Coalitional Value for Multichoice Games with a Coalition Structure

“…Calvo and Santos [6] researched a value for multichoice games by restricting the Aumann-Shapley value for continuum games in framework of multichoice games. Peters and Zank [7] proposed the egalitarian solution for multichoice games with each player having the same number of activity levels, which is an extension of the egalitarian solution proposed by Dutta and Ray [8] for traditional games. Recently, Hwang and Liao [9] investigated the weighted associated consistent value, and characterized it by means of the weighted balanced contributions and the associated consistency.…”