A Contractarian Theory of Property Rights and Crime

Skogh, Göran; Stuart, Charles Alexander

doi:10.2307/3439777

Cited by 49 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Although these literatures are much smaller than those of mainstream policy analysis, it is a significant literature. The modern economic literature on unproductive conflict begins with Tullock's (1967) piece on the losses from monopolization and crime, and with a volume that Tullock (1972) edited on anarchy Buchanan (1975) and Skogh and Stuart (1982) analyze how various constitutional features may be adopted to limit unproductive kinds of competition, especially with respect to involuntary transfers of property. The role of institutions in determining the extent and kind of competition that takes place was explored in Congleton (1980).…”

Section: David Flathmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Dark Side of the Force: Economic Foundations of Conflict Theory, by Hirshleifer, J. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 366 pp., USD 90/GBP 60 (cloth); USD 29.95/GBP 20.95 (paper).

Congleton

2002

Manage Decis Econ

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Section: David Flathmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Dark Side of the Force: Economic Foundations of Conflict Theory, by Hirshleifer, J. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 366 pp., USD 90/GBP 60 (cloth); USD 29.95/GBP 20.95 (paper).

Congleton

2002

Manage Decis Econ

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“…2. The underpinnings of the present analysis are contractarian (cf Buchanan (1975), Bush and Meyer (1974), and Skogh and Stuart (1981). 3.…”

Section: Simplifications For Cost-benefit Purposesmentioning

confidence: 99%

An economic analysis of crime rates, punishment, and the social consequences of crime

Skogh

Stuart

1982

Public Choice

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“…Recent contributions to the analysis of conflict in a general equilibrium setting include, among others, Kim (1995, 1996), Hirshleifer (1988Hirshleifer ( , 1991Hirshleifer ( , 1995, Noh (1997. 1998), Skaperdas (1992, and Skogh and Stuart (1982).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Two And One Sided Conflict: Effectiveness and Scale in a Ratio Form of Conflict Technology

Jae

1999

International Economic Journal

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This paper investigates how resources are allocated in the conflict when the conflict technology is given by a ratio form that has both effectiveness and scale parameters. The analysis shows that the 'paradox of power' as identified by Hirshleifer (1991) is not a general result in the equilibrium of a conflict. In the interior solution of two sided conflict, it is shown that, as resource disparity increases, the less endowed agent becomes more aggressive by allocating a larger fraction of resources to offense and smaller fractions both do defense and production. As offense becomes more effective, the less endowed agent allocates a larger fraction of his resources to offense. However, as scale effect becomes larger, he allocates more resources to offense only when offense is not relatively too much ineffective. In the Nash interior solution of one sided conflict, when offense becomes more effective, the ratio of offense to defense decreases but this reduces the fraction the prey retains of his produced output. However, when scale effect becomes larger, the prey retains a smaller portion of his produced output with a smaller ratio of offense to defense only when offense is sufficiently more effective relative to defense. [C70, D60, D74]

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A Contractarian Theory of Property Rights and Crime

Cited by 49 publications

References 6 publications

The Dark Side of the Force: Economic Foundations of Conflict Theory, by Hirshleifer, J. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 366 pp., USD 90/GBP 60 (cloth); USD 29.95/GBP 20.95 (paper).

The Dark Side of the Force: Economic Foundations of Conflict Theory, by Hirshleifer, J. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 366 pp., USD 90/GBP 60 (cloth); USD 29.95/GBP 20.95 (paper).

An economic analysis of crime rates, punishment, and the social consequences of crime

Two And One Sided Conflict: Effectiveness and Scale in a Ratio Form of Conflict Technology

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