We estimate that unemployment insurance (UI ) extensions reduce reemployment wages using sharp age discontinuities in UI eligibility in Germany. We show this effect combines two key policy parameters: the effect of UI on reservation wages and the effect of nonemployment durations on wage offers. Our framework implies if UI extensions do not affect wages conditional on duration, then reservation wages do not bind. We derive resulting instrumental variable estimates for the effect of nonemployment durations on wage offers and bounds for reservation wage effects. The effect of UI on wages we find arises mainly from substantial negative nonemployment duration effects.(JEL J31, J64, J65)At the peak of the Great Recession, Congress extended unemployment insurance (UI) durations to 99 weeks, almost four times the usual duration. While a substantial literature has assessed the potential consequences of such UI extensions on employment (e.g., Meyer 1990; Rothstein 2011; Kroft and Notowidigdo 2015; Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender 2012a, b;Farber and Valletta 2013), fewer papers have studied the effect of UI extensions on reemployment wages. Recent studies find that UI extensions have small effects on reemployment wages with typically negative point estimates (e.g., Lalive 2007;Card, Chetty, and Weber 2007;Centeno and Novo 2009). In this paper we show that these estimates represent the sum of several potentially offsetting components: Firstly, UI extensions increase the outside option of workers and thus may push up equilibrium wages of individuals who find jobs (either due to an increase in reservation wages or a stronger bargaining position).