A cost allocation problem arising in hub–spoke network systems

Matsubayashi, Nobuo; Umezawa, Masashi; Masuda, Yasushi; Nishino, Hisakazu

doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2003.05.002

Cited by 40 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…It is therefore vital to deal with the notion of fairness more explicitly. Cooperative game theory is a field of research that describes fairness in a sensible way (Matsubayashi et al, 2005). Hence, we suggest, in line with Cruijssen et al (2010), to use game theoretical methods in 4-C for suitable gain-sharing.…”

Section: Problem Settingmentioning

confidence: 95%

Vehicle Planning in Cross Chain Control Centers

Schijndel

Braat

2012

SSRN Journal

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General rightsCopyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.-Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research -You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain -You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright, please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. AbstractTo satisfy the growing need for efficient supply chain orchestration, a Cross Chain Control Center (4-C) might be an effective concept. A 4-C is a center from which multiple supply chains are controlled simultaneously, thereby aiming to exploit synergetic potential. This article proposes optimization approaches for transport timetabling and vehicle routing of multiple shippers that are controlled by a 4-C. We associate inconvenience with the requirement that shippers typically need to deviate from their individual schedules in order to make collaboration possible. This brings up a natural trade-off between inconvenience and transportation costs, which forms the essence of the proposed optimization models. Next, we pay attention to a fair redistribution of exploited synergy to the collaborating shippers. By considering several test cases, we find perfectly intuitively clear results supporting the applicability of this new approach to supply chain collaboration.

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Section: Problem Settingmentioning

confidence: 95%

Vehicle Planning in Cross Chain Control Centers

Schijndel

Braat

2012

SSRN Journal

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“…Additionally, Marin et al [38] presented a novel formulation, which is a generalization of the prior formulations and relaxes the assumption of having a cost structure satisfying triangle inequality. To scrutinize the recent research pieces considering a fixed cost hub problem, the reader can look at some other studies [39,40].…”

Section: Fixed-cost Hub Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Robust and fuzzy goal programming optimization approaches for a novel multi-objective hub location-allocation problem: A supply chain overview

Ghodratnama

Tavakkoli–Moghaddam

Azaron

2015

Applied Soft Computing

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“…He proposed to use proportional cost allocation rules and applied his models to a data set of airline passengers in the United States in 1970, obtained from the Civil Aeronautics Board. Matsubayashi et al (2005) applies cooperative game theory to transportation of data packages in a telecommunication network. In that paper it is explored the cost allocation problem associated with hub-spoke network systems to be constructed by several agents.…”

Section: Cost Allocation and Transportationmentioning

confidence: 99%