A Cost-Efficient System for Detecting an Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI) attack

Dawson, J.F.; Flintoft, Ian D.; Kortoci, P; Dawson, Linda; Marvin, A.C.; Robinson, M.P.; Stojilović, Mirjana; Rubinstein, Marcos; Menssen, Benjamin; Garbe, Heyno; Hirschi, Werner; Rouiller, L.

doi:10.1109/emceurope.2014.6931096

Cited by 22 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…Note that although some of the following approaches are initially designed for sensors, similar ideas possibly work in actuator systems, too. Researchers developed standalone detection systems that capture electromagnetic waves by dedicated antennas and then use intricate circuits to process the captured signals for detection [1,2,7]. Kune et al [25] investigated using extra antennas or conductors to capture and measure attacking signals for detection, and the measurements can be then used by their adaptive filtering mechanism as mentioned previously.…”

Section: Detectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Detection of Electromagnetic Signal Injection Attacks on Actuator Systems

Zhang¹,

Rasmussen²

2022

Preprint

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An actuator is a device that converts electricity into another form of energy, typically physical movement. They are absolutely essential for any system that needs to impact or modify the physical world, and are used in millions of systems of all sizes, all over the world, from cars and spacecraft to factory control systems and critical infrastructure. An actuator is a "dumb device" that is entirely controlled by the surrounding electronics, e.g., a microcontroller, and thus cannot authenticate its control signals or do any other form of processing. The problem we look at in this paper is how the wires that connect an actuator to its control electronics can act like antennas, picking up electromagnetic signals from the environment. This makes it possible for a remote attacker to wirelessly inject signals (energy) into these wires to bypass the controller and directly control the actuator.To detect such attacks, we propose a novel detection method that allows the microcontroller to monitor the control signal and detect attacks as a deviation from the intended value. We have managed to do this without requiring the microcontroller to sample the signal at a high rate or run any signal processing. That makes our defense mechanism practical and easy to integrate into existing systems. Our method is general and applies to any type of actuator (provided a few basic assumptions are met), and can deal with adversaries with arbitrarily high transmission power. We implement our detection method on two different practical systems to show its generality, effectiveness, and robustness.

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Section: Detectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Detection of Electromagnetic Signal Injection Attacks on Actuator Systems

Zhang¹,

Rasmussen²

2022

Preprint

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“…Perhaps, the most advantageous way to deal with IEMI attacks is to install a sensory device that would detect the IEMI attack at early stages and shutdown sensitive electronics before the attack can make any permanent damage. Some prototypes in this area have been built and tested [21]. Some products are available for purchase.…”

Section: Imei Defense Mechanismsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Susceptibility of a Smart Home to Intentional Electromagnetic Interference Attacks

Davlyatov¹,

Mahfouz²,

Jones³

et al. 2015

NN-EEE

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Technology advancements are shaping the construction industry gradually. Smart homes have become a reality and insome cases a trend due to these advancements. Although the literature includes multitude of efforts addressing the technologies used in smart homes, integration processes, and privacy issues, little exists about their vulnerability to Intentional ElectroMagnetic Interference (IEMI). In an attempt to address this gap, the purpose of this paper is to investigate the proliferation of smart home technologies, their susceptibility to IEMI attacks, currently available mechanisms of defense, and to provide a cost assessment model of the most suited protection approaches to be adopted by the construction industry. To that end, the adopted research methodology collected and analyzed a set of relevant peer reviewed publication within the domain, and developed different construction cost estimates utilizing standard reference books, like RSMeans, and direct contact with system suppliers. The outcomes of the aforementioned methodology yielded two potential protection methods, namely full protection of the home shell; and partial protection for essential components while providing a detection system of potential attacks. The average achieved costs per square foot range from $7.91 to $20.11 depending on the selection of material and type of finish. It is instigated that the outcomes of this research provide a much needed knowledge about the propensity of smart homes to IMEI attacks and provide a guidance cost estimate for protection mechanism. It also provides a better understanding for home owners regarding their decisions.

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“…We can find ICs nearly everywhere: in computers (of course), in cellphones, watches, medical devices, cars.... Moreover, in recent years, raises serious preoccupations on the vulnerability of electronic equipment to intentional EMI attacks [1][2][3][4][5]: sources capable of producing very high RF power over a wide frequency range are, indeed, presently easily available or even home-made manufacturable. In general, as shown in Figures 1 and 2, Electromagnetic Compatibility issues can be divided into two parts: emissions and susceptibility.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

EMI Susceptibility of the Output Pin in CMOS Amplifiers

2020

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Measurements in commercial devices demonstrate a considerable susceptibility of the operational amplifiers to the electromagnetic interferences coupled to their output pin. This paper investigates some basic architectures starting from single stage amplifiers up to a whole operational amplifier. The result is a correlation between the different amplifier configurations, the output impedance and the susceptibility to the interferences. The simulations are perfomed by using the standard CMOS UMC 180nm technology and by running the netlist of the schematics extracted from the layout.

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A Cost-Efficient System for Detecting an Intentional Electromagnetic Interference (IEMI) attack

Abstract: This paper describes a cost-efficient Intentional EMI Detection system and gives a brief overview of the identification and location system being developed as part of the STRUCTURES project.

Cited by 22 publications

References 9 publications

Detection of Electromagnetic Signal Injection Attacks on Actuator Systems

Detection of Electromagnetic Signal Injection Attacks on Actuator Systems

Susceptibility of a Smart Home to Intentional Electromagnetic Interference Attacks

EMI Susceptibility of the Output Pin in CMOS Amplifiers

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