A Critique of Dialetheism

Littman, Greg; Simmons, Keith

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199265176.003.0020

Cited by 15 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…Recently, attempts have been made to produce such a revenge paradox by phrasing the paradox in terms of semantic value. As has been argued by Everett (1993), Smiley (1993), Bromand (2002) and Littmann and Simmons (2004), such revenge Liars threaten dialetheism with triviality.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 92%

“…IV The Graphic Liar Littmann and Simmons (2004) attempt to eliminate the problem of clearly expressing sole falsehood by representing their semantic value Liar graphically. They offer the three semantic values in the form of three diagrams, E1, E2 and E3, representing respectively the semantic values 'true only,' 'false only,' and 'both true and false.…”

Section: The Problem Is Clear Expressionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Dialetheism and the Graphic Liar

Littmann

2012

Can. J. of Philosophy

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A Liar sentence is a sentence that, paradoxically, we cannot evaluate for truth in accordance with classical logic and semantics without arriving at a contradiction. For example, consider LL L is falseIf we assume that L is true, then given that what L says is ‘L is false,’ it follows that L is false. On the other hand, if we assume that L is false, then given that what L says is ‘L is false,’ it follows that L is true. Thus, L is an example of a Liar sentence.Several philosophers have proposed that the Liar paradox, and related paradoxes, can be solved by accepting the contradictions that these paradoxes seem to imply (including Priest 2006, Rescher and Brandom 1980). The theory that there are true contradictions is known as ‘dialetheism’ and we may call this the ‘dialethic solution.’ One standard response to the dialethic solution to the Liar paradox and related paradoxes has been to attempt to develop new ‘revenge’ versions of the paradoxes that are not subject to the dialethic solution (e.g. Parsons 1990, Restall 2007, Shapiro 2007).

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 92%

Section: The Problem Is Clear Expressionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dialetheism and the Graphic Liar

Littmann

2012

Can. J. of Philosophy

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“…I believe this sort of point was first made by Parsons (). Related points are made by Weir (, §6) and by Littman and Simmons (, §§4–6). …”

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confidence: 87%

More on ‘A Liar Paradox’

Heck

2012

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy

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“…• Dialetheically suitable logics suffer just as much from revenge paradoxes as nondialetheic logics. (Littmann and Simmons 2004;Scharp 2013: Ch. 4) • Dialetheic arguments appeal to inappropriate vernacular data.…”

Section: Expanding the Searchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Identifying logical evidence

Martin

2020

Synthese

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Given the plethora of competing logical theories of validity available, it’s understandable that there has been a marked increase in interest in logical epistemology within the literature. If we are to choose between these logical theories, we require a good understanding of the suitable criteria we ought to judge according to. However, so far there’s been a lack of appreciation of how logical practice could support an epistemology of logic. This paper aims to correct that error, by arguing for a practice-based approach to logical epistemology. By looking at the types of evidence logicians actually appeal to in attempting to support their theories, we can provide a more detailed and realistic picture of logical epistemology. To demonstrate the fruitfulness of a practice-based approach, we look to a particular case of logical argumentation—the dialetheist’s arguments based upon the self-referential paradoxes—and show that the evidence appealed to support a particular theory of logical epistemology, logical abductivism.

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A Critique of Dialetheism

Cited by 15 publications

References 8 publications

Dialetheism and the Graphic Liar

Dialetheism and the Graphic Liar

More on ‘A Liar Paradox’

Identifying logical evidence

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