A Crook is a Crook . . . But is He Still a Crook Abroad? On the Effect of Immigration on Destination-Country Corruption

Abstract

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. This paper analyzes the impact of migration on destination-country corruption levels. Capitalizing on a comprehensive dataset consisting of annual immigration stocks of OECD countries from 207 countries of origin for the period 1984-2008, we explore different channels through which corruption might migrate. We employ different estimation methods using Fixed Effects (FE) and Tobit regressions in order to validate our findings. Moreover, we also address the issue of endogeneity by using the Difference-Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator. Independent of the econometric methodology, we consistently find that while general migration has an insignificant effect on the destination country's corruption level, immigration from corruption-ridden origin countries boosts corruption in the destination country. Our findings provide a more profound understanding of the socioeconomic implications associated with migration flows. Terms of use: Documents inJEL-Code: D730, F220, O150.

Cultural Baggage: Do Immigrants Import Corruption?

“…Second, we repeat this analysis utilizing a shorter time frame with five‐year periods (Table 6b). These latter estimates are more comparable to the ones presented in Dimant, Krieger, and Redlin ().…”

“…Similar to our study, Dimant, Krieger, and Redlin () estimate the effect of immigration from 207 countries of origin on corruption in OECD countries only, finding that immigrants coming from more corrupt origins are the most harmful . However, they rely on an annual regression specification with immigration lagged by at most five years and corruption lagged by one year.…”

“…Because social institutions are slow changing (Roland 2004), it is difficult to understand the effects of migration over this short time frame. Nevertheless, we expand upon the Dimant, Krieger, and Redlin (2015) study and estimate the effect of "more corrupt" migrants on corruption over five-year periods using a wider sample for comparison purposes. 2 Interestingly, while Dimant, Krieger, and Redlin (2015) find no robust effects when immigration is lagged beyond three years, we find evidence that relatively more corrupt migrants may reduce corruption in the destination country over a five-year period.…”

“…Nevertheless, we expand upon the Dimant, Krieger, and Redlin (2015) study and estimate the effect of "more corrupt" migrants on corruption over five-year periods using a wider sample for comparison purposes. 2 Interestingly, while Dimant, Krieger, and Redlin (2015) find no robust effects when immigration is lagged beyond three years, we find evidence that relatively more corrupt migrants may reduce corruption in the destination country over a five-year period. However, because our focus is on the long run, we additionally follow the empirical methodology of Clark et al (2015) and examine the effects of immigrant stocks and flows on corruption over a 20-year period.…”

“…The restriction of destination possibilities to only OECD countries in Dimant, Krieger, and Redlin () makes it impossible to test whether the effects of immigration are worse in other high income countries as traditionally feared.…”