A Cross-Layer Defense Mechanism Against GPS Spoofing Attacks on PMUs in Smart Grids

Yi, Fan; Zhang, Zhenghao; Trinkle, Matthew; Dimitrovski, Aleksandar; Song, Ju Bin; Li, Husheng

doi:10.1109/tsg.2014.2346088

Cited by 119 publications

(51 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Subsequent risk is related to location-related attacks. The GPS signal could be vulnerable to position lock (jamming) or to feeding the receiver with false information, so that it computes an erroneous time or location (spoofing) [190,191]. Similar techniques may be applied to cellular-and WLAN-based location services [192,193].…”

Section: Security and Privacymentioning

confidence: 99%

Multi-Factor Authentication: A Survey

et al. 2018

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Today, digitalization decisively penetrates all the sides of the modern society. One of the key enablers to maintain this process secure is authentication. It covers many different areas of a hyper-connected world, including online payments, communications, access right management, etc. This work sheds light on the evolution of authentication systems towards Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) starting from Single-Factor Authentication (SFA) and through Two-Factor Authentication (2FA). Particularly, MFA is expected to be utilized for human-to-everything interactions by enabling fast, user-friendly, and reliable authentication when accessing a service. This paper surveys the already available and emerging sensors (factor providers) that allow for authenticating a user with the system directly or by involving the cloud. The corresponding challenges from the user as well as the service provider perspective are also reviewed. The MFA system based on reversed Lagrange polynomial within Shamir's Secret Sharing (SSS) scheme is further proposed to enable more flexible authentication. This solution covers the cases of authenticating the user even if some of the factors are mismatched or absent. Our framework allows for qualifying the missing factors by authenticating the user without disclosing sensitive biometric data to the verification entity. Finally, a vision of the future trends in MFA is discussed.

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Section: Security and Privacymentioning

confidence: 99%

Multi-Factor Authentication: A Survey

et al. 2018

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“…In [8], the authors describe a defense mechanism against GPS spoofing attacks on PMUs, based on cross-check of angle-ofarrival (AOA) detection mechanism and residual-based baddata detection. Still, AOA detection feature in GPS receivers is not widely available for off-the-shelf PMUs, and residualbased bad-data detection techniques are ineffective against the attack described in this paper.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Undetectable Timing-Attack on Linear State-Estimation by Using Rank-1 Approximation

Barreto

Pignati

Dán

et al. 2018

IEEE Trans. Smart Grid

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Abstract-Smart-grid applications based on synchrophasor measurements have recently been shown to be vulnerable to timing attacks. A fundamental question is whether timing attacks could remain undetected by bad-data detection algorithms used in conjunction with state-of-the-art situational-awareness state estimators.In this paper, we analyze the detectability of timing attacks on linear state-estimation. We show that it is possible to forge delay attacks that are undetectable. We give a closed form for an undetectable attack; it imposes two phase offsets to two or more synchrophasor-based measurement units that can be translated to synchrophasors' time delays. We also propose different methods for combining two-delays attacks to produce a larger impact. We simulate the attacks on a benchmark powertransmission grid, we show that they are successful and can lead to physical grid damage. To prove undetectability, we use classic bad-data detection techniques such as the largest normalized residual and the χ 2 -test.

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“…In addition, PMUs use the GPS signal from satellites. Attackers may create abnormal operating conditions on a power grid by jamming or spoofing GPS signals [17,18].…”

Section: Pmumentioning

confidence: 99%

Cyber-Physical System Security of a Power Grid: State-of-the-Art

2016

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Abstract:As part of the smart grid development, more and more technologies are developed and deployed on the power grid to enhance the system reliability. A primary purpose of the smart grid is to significantly increase the capability of computer-based remote control and automation. As a result, the level of connectivity has become much higher, and cyber security also becomes a potential threat to the cyber-physical systems (CPSs). In this paper, a survey of the state-of-the-art is conducted on the cyber security of the power grid concerning issues of: (1) the structure of CPSs in a smart grid; (2) cyber vulnerability assessment; (3) cyber protection systems; and (4) testbeds of a CPS. At Washington State University (WSU), the Smart City Testbed (SCT) has been developed to provide a platform to test, analyze and validate defense mechanisms against potential cyber intrusions. A test case is provided in this paper to demonstrate how a testbed helps the study of cyber security and the anomaly detection system (ADS) for substations.

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A Cross-Layer Defense Mechanism Against GPS Spoofing Attacks on PMUs in Smart Grids

Cited by 119 publications

References 14 publications

Multi-Factor Authentication: A Survey

Multi-Factor Authentication: A Survey

Undetectable Timing-Attack on Linear State-Estimation by Using Rank-1 Approximation

Cyber-Physical System Security of a Power Grid: State-of-the-Art

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