A Cumulative Case Argument for Infallibilism

Climenhaga, Nevin

doi:10.4324/9780429353468-6

Cited by 6 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…In reply, the advocate of GA can note that there are plausible defenses of epistemic infallibilism, which is the view that knowledge requires such certainty. Climenhaga (2021) argues that infallibilism provides a superior explanation for several important epistemological claims as compared to versions of fallibilism. Infallibilism offers a better account for why there is a lack of knowledge in Gettier cases, why knowledge is more valuable than non-knowledge, why knowledge justifies rational action, and why knowledge permits one to stop inquiring into that which is known.…”

Section: Insufficiency Objectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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An Investigation of Conditions for the Meaning of Life

Crozat

2023

Perichoresis

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According to purpose theory (PT), God’s existence, telic creation of human beings, and human libertarian free will are necessary conditions for human life to be objectively meaningful. In this paper, I raise and respond to four objections to PT: two concerning insufficiencies and two regarding ambiguities in the theory. I conclude that PT-advocates have relatively effective replies to the second insufficiency objection and to both ambiguity objections, but that PT is vulnerable to the first insufficiency objection.

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Section: Insufficiency Objectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Several recent arguments support the claim that epistemic certainty is required for knowledge. For example, see Mizrani (2019) and Climenhaga (2021). In the next section, I investigate four objections to PT.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

An Investigation of Conditions for the Meaning of Life

Crozat

2023

Perichoresis

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“…Nor have you listened to much talk radio or visited many internet comments sections. And, of course, some epistemologists (e.g., Climenhaga, 2021 ; Keren, 2023 ), respectively) still think knowledge requires infallible support and that it is at least plausible that testimony doesn’t deliver knowledge. That’s to say that there are current debates in SPE whose resolution is necessary for complete guidance.…”

Section: A Particularist Objectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Guidance and mainstream epistemology

Fantl

2023

Philos Stud

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According to one prominent critique of mainstream epistemology, discoveries about what it takes to know or justifiedly believe that p can’t provide the right kind of intellectual guidance. As Mark Webb puts it, “the kinds of principles that are developed in this tradition are of no use in helping people in their ordinary epistemic practices.” In this paper I defend a certain form of traditional epistemology against this “regulative” critique. Traditional epistemology can provide—and, indeed, can be essential for—intellectual guidance. The reason is that, in many cases, how you should proceed intellectually depends on what you already know or justifiedly believe: how you should treat counterevidence to your beliefs, for example, can depend on whether those beliefs count as knowledge. Therefore, to get guidance on how to proceed intellectually, it will often be essential to be able to figure out what you know or justifiedly believe. And to do that it will often be helpful to try to figure out what it takes to count as knowledge or justified belief in the first place. To do this is precisely to engage in mainstream epistemology.

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“…21 Stoutenburg 2021, 80. 22 For some addition recent defenses of skeptical infallibilism see Kyriacou 2017, 2021aand Climenhaga 2021 Note also that the invariantist position that philosophers typically take other than skeptical invariantism ('moderate invariantism') still requires some moderate level of justification. See, for example Rysiew 2001, Brown 2006, and Gerken 2017.…”

Section: Knowledge Versus Justificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reasoning One’s Way Back into Skepticism

Satta

2023

Int. J. Study Skept.

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Susanna Rinard aims to show that it is possible to rationally persuade an external world skeptic to reject external world skepticism. She offers an argument meant to convince a skeptic who accepts her views on “several orthogonal issues in epistemology” to give up their external world skepticism. While I agree with Rinard that it is possible to reason with a skeptic, I argue that Rinard overlooks a variety of good epistemic grounds a skeptic could appeal to in rejecting her argument and its conclusion. More specifically, I argue that the external world skeptic can resist Rinard’s conclusion by (1) distinguishing between skepticism about knowledge and skepticism about justification, (2) by prioritizing obtaining accurate beliefs (maximizing true beliefs and minimizing false beliefs) over being rational, or (3) by treating suspension of judgment as the default rational doxastic attitude.

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A Cumulative Case Argument for Infallibilism

Cited by 6 publications

References 16 publications

An Investigation of Conditions for the Meaning of Life

An Investigation of Conditions for the Meaning of Life

Guidance and mainstream epistemology

Reasoning One’s Way Back into Skepticism

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