A Decade Since Busan: Towards Legitimacy or a ‘New Tyranny’ of Global Development Partnership?

Doing aid chains differently: Evaluating the potential ofMulti‐StakeholderPartnerships

“…While MSPs are constructed as global and apolitical through their reliance on technical, objective measures, actors' strategies within MSP frameworks remain shaped by their differing resources and capacities across multiple governance scales. Moreover, adversarial relations connected to MSPs take many forms and exist both within and beyond the MSPs themselves (Fougère & Solitander, 2020; Menashy, 2018; Taggart, 2022). Indeed, Taggart argues that “power hierarchies result from capacity differentials,” with resource‐poor participants unable to equally participate (2022, p. 10).…”

“…Studies of MSPs have highlighted how, rather than providing space for dissent and deliberation, their internal dynamics often “reflect and reproduce existing power relationships among stakeholders” (Konefal et al, 2019, p. 294), such that the apparent “consensus” generated is in fact “more of a hegemonic accommodation to dominant interests” (Banerjee, 2018, p. 803). This exclusionary dynamic is evident in the weak representation of vulnerable, marginalized, or disadvantaged groups, notably those organizing around issues experienced in low‐ and middle‐income countries (Cheyns, 2014; Köhne, 2014; Menashy, 2018; Nelson & Tallontire, 2014; Ponte, 2008; Ponte & Cheyns, 2013; Taggart, 2022; Utting, 2002). Lawer (2019) attributes this exclusionary dynamic to actors that possess network‐making power and networked power exhibiting greater influence over the design of standards and the policy tools that are promoted as “best practice.” Similarly, Bartley's (2021, p. 11) power‐centric approach to analysis demonstrates how corporations are not, indeed, just one stakeholder among many; their “privileged position within the apparatus of transnational private regulation” means that MSPs are “saturated” with corporate power.…”

“…However, despite the commitment to inclusivity, large South–South co‐operation providers (China, India, Brazil) have chosen not to participate because these governments view it as led by traditional donors (Li et al, 2018). On participation, while there is de jure equality, there is de facto inequality: recipient countries have found the GPEDC to be a useful forum for having their voice heard (Taggart, 2020, p. 13), but at the same time their limited resources inhibit their full participation (Taggart, 2022, p. 10). On representation, those actors that consider themselves well‐represented are those that have strong pre‐existing networks of representation and consultation in place (primarily DAC donors and some large NGOs) (Taggart, 2022, p. 9).…”

“…MSPs have proliferated across all global policy areas. In development governance they are now the “governance modality of choice” (Taggart, 2022, p. 2), where their growth has been heralded as one of the most significant recent trends (Reinsberg & Westerwinter, 2021). The shift to embrace MSPs in development governance has been driven by two agendas: aid effectiveness and the illegitimacy of the Northern donor system of governance (Abdenur & da Fonseca, 2013).…”

“…Indeed, some regard them as the “gold standard” for regulating GVCs (Schleifer, 2019, p. 50). Critics, meanwhile, highlight how MSPs may reinforce power asymmetries, with MSPs' rhetoric of partnership and equality masking structures and practices that perpetuate unequal power relations (Cheyns & Riisgaard, 2014; Taggart, 2022). An extensive literature documents MSPs' emergence and evolution across all global policy areas, including development governance.…”