A Defence of Hart's Semantics as Nonambitious Conceptual Analysis

Abstract

Two methodological claims in Hart's The Concept of Law have produced perplexity: that it is a book on "analytic jurisprudence" 1 and that it may also be regarded as an essay in "descriptive sociology." 2 Are these two ideas reconcilable? We know that mere analysis of our legal concepts cannot tell us much about their properties, that is, about the empirical aspect of law. We have learned this from philosophical criticisms of conceptual analysis; yet Hart informs us that analytic jurisprudence can be reconciled with descriptive sociology. The answer to this puzzle lies in the notion of nonambitious conceptual analysis. The theorist analyzes concepts but accepts the limitations of conceptual analysis and therefore uses empirical knowledge and substantive arguments to explain, refine, or perhaps refute initial insights provided by intuitions. This is the conclusion that this paper arrives at as an argumentative strategy to defend Hart's legal theory from the criticisms of Stavropoulos and Dworkin. The latter argues that Hart's legal theory cannot explain theoretical disagreements in law because he relies on a shared criterial semantics. Stavropoulos aims to show that Hart's semantics is committed to ambitious conceptual analysis and relies on the usage of our words as a standard of correctness. Both attacks aim to show that the semantic sting stings Hart's legal theory. This essay refines both challenges and concludes that not even in the light of the most charitable interpretation of these criticisms is Hart's legal theory stung by the semantic sting. This study defends the view that Hart's methodological claims were modest and that he was aware of the limits of conceptual analysis as a philosophical method. He was, this study claims, far ahead of his time.

Naturaleza y concepto del Derecho a los ojos de Rodríguez-Blanco. Un análisis naturalista de su propuesta metodológica

“…V.g. en suRodríguez-Blanco, 2003, p. 99-124.y en Rodríguez-Blanco, 2006 (criticando a Dworkin y Perry).29 Sobre cómo identificar las teorías populares o folktheories: "To the extent that our intuitions coincide, they reveal our shared theory and to the extent that our intuitions coincide with those of the folk, they reveal the folk theory"(Rodríguez-Blanco, 2006, p. 38).30 Esta opción acercaría la concepción de Rodríguez-Blanco a la de Frank Jackson y su análisis conceptual no ambicioso(Jackson, 1994, p. 23-42.…”

Direito e método: a contribuição de Ronald Dworkin

“…(FARRELL, 2006(FARRELL, , p. 1002). 17 O argumento elaborado por STAVROPOULOS (2001) segundo o qual Hart teria se comprometido com uma análise conceitual ambiciosa, que o levaria a adotar uma teoria semântica criterial, é diretamente refutado por RODRIGUEZ-BLANCO (2003). FARRELL (2006) também defende que Hart se limitou à análise conceitual modesta, mas seu argumento não é incompatível com o de STAVROPOULOS.…”

“…Essa caracterização da teoria de Hart é extremamente controversa, e há várias linhas de defesa do positivismo contra o argumento do ferrão semântico. Há autores que negam que Hart tenha construído uma teoria semântica (ENDICOTT, 1998;RODRIGUEZ-BLANCO, 2003), enquanto outros afirmam que, mesmo havendo uma semântica criterial com a qual ele tenha se comprometido, disso não decorreriam as dificuldades apontadas por Dworkin para explicar as divergências teóricas, pois estas poderiam decorrer, por exemplo, do desacordo na aplicação dos critérios compartilhados (RAZ, 1998;COLEMAN, 2002) 58 .…”