A Defence of the New Tenseless Theory of Time

Oaklander, L. Nathan

doi:10.2307/2219784

Cited by 43 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 6 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…One B-theoretic response was to admit that tensed sentences express tensed propositions that differ from (and cannot be reduced to or eliminated in favor of) tenseless propositions, but that tensed propositions only serve as the objects of belief ; the world is described by tenseless propositions (Mellor 1981;1998 ;Beer 1988 ;Oaklander 1990 ). As L. Nathan Oaklander points out (Oaklander 2004 , 249), these "two-level" theories entail that there is no single language that is adequate to represent both the semantics (meaning) of temporal sentences and the ontology (reality) of time.…”

Section: The Language Of Timementioning

confidence: 99%

The B‐Theory in the Twentieth Century

Mozersky

2013

A Companion to the Philosophy of Time

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: The Language Of Timementioning

confidence: 99%

The B‐Theory in the Twentieth Century

Mozersky

2013

A Companion to the Philosophy of Time

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…7 Tooley (1997), Oaklander (1994), Beer (1988) and Mellor (1998) have presented such a date-theoretic analysis of A-statements. I am not claiming here that these authors aim to provide an explanation of a true 'now'-belief (as the anonymous reviewer has remarked, their stated aim is only to account for its truth conditions).…”

Section: Casementioning

confidence: 99%

Smart and Tensed Beliefs

Tsompanidis

2009

Philosophia

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The aim of this paper is to defend a prototype B-theory answer to McTaggart's Puzzle about Time. Smart hopes to solve the issue by pointing to the "anthropocentricity" of temporal A-notions. There is one important problem: explaining Prior cases (for instance being relieved that a painful experience is over) in B-theoretic terms. First, it is argued that the problem is how to explain the nature of the subject's tensed belief in Prior cases; the essential indexicality of the concept 'now'. Then it is suggested that Smart could utilize Burge's framework for dealing with de re beliefs and a way of formalizing tensed beliefs is proposed. The last section of the paper deals with the exact role of the formalized indexical element. If these three steps are worked out, we might have an explanation of the facts involved in Prior cases without mentioning any A-facts. Hence an important problem to a Smart-influenced B-theory is solved, and McTaggart's Puzzle answered in an adequate manner.

show abstract

“…Therefore, given a reductionist account of time, the date theory fails. 13 See Oaklander (1994), Le Poidevin (1995), Paul (1997), and Dyke (2002). 14 In Smith (1993) he cites a number of cases in which this view is adopted.…”

Section: Evaluating the Date Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The implications of Smith's objections for the token-reflexive theory are discussed below. Despite being renounced by Mellor, the token-reflexive theory continues to be defended by many including NathanOaklander (1994), ManualGarcia-Carpintero (1998), Heather Dyke (2002. 4 Proponents of this view includeSmart (1980), Oaklander (1994), and Le Poidevin (2003.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Truth-conditions, truth-bearers and the new B-theory of time

Torre

2007

Philos Stud

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper I consider two strategies for providing tenseless truthconditions for tensed sentences: the token-reflexive theory and the date theory. Both theories have faced a number of objections by prominent A-theorists such as Quentin Smith and William Lane Craig. Traditionally, these two theories have been viewed as rival methods for providing truth-conditions for tensed sentences. I argue that the debate over whether the token-reflexive theory or the date theory is true has arisen from a failure to distinguish between conditions for the truth of tensed tokens and conditions for the truth of propositions expressed by tensed tokens. I demonstrate that there is a true formulation of the token-reflexive theory that provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of tensed tokens, and there is a true formulation of the date theory that provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the truth of propositions expressed by tensed tokens. I argue that once the views are properly formulated, the A-theorist's objections fail to make their mark. However, I conclude by claiming that even though there is a true formulation of the tokenreflexive theory and a true formulation of the date theory, the New B-theory nonetheless fails to provide a complete account of the truth and falsity of tensed sentences.

show abstract

A Defence of the New Tenseless Theory of Time

Cited by 43 publications

References 6 publications

The B‐Theory in the Twentieth Century

The B‐Theory in the Twentieth Century

Smart and Tensed Beliefs

Truth-conditions, truth-bearers and the new B-theory of time

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About