A deficit of democratic authenticity: Political linkage and the public in Andean polities

Conaghan, Catherine M.

doi:10.1007/bf02738988

Cited by 19 publications

(17 citation statements)

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“…O'Donnell (1994) and Conaghan (1996) indicate that party ideology is not a good predictor of what politicians will do once in office while Stokes (2001) concludes that pre-electoral indications of one's intentions probably are no worse an indicator in Latin America over the last two decades than in other times and places. Using Stokes's relatively optimistic assessment of Latin American democracy and the extant literature on developed nations as the baseline, we hypothesize: H1: The ideological reputation of the president's party will be a good predictor of his or her economic program once in office.…”

Section: Voters' Preferences Ideological Reputations and Electoral mentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Both O'Donnell (1994) and Conaghan (1996) stress executives' tendency to act unilaterally and implement policy without debate. In contrast, Stokes (2001) argues that executives usually pursue their electoral mandates, but she fails to account for executives' powers.…”

Section: Electoral Mandates and Institutional Powersmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…However, he notes that voters still have the right to punish politicians at the next election, making his characterization of Latin America's democracies as "selfcorrecting" more optimistic than the characterization byO'Donnell (1994) andConaghan (1996).…”

mentioning

confidence: 95%

“…Democratically elected governments were caught between the international prescription for more markets and domestic pressure for protection from painful reforms. If governments succumbed to the international pressure to push forward market-oriented reform, they did so through undemocratic means (Conaghan 1996). First, candidates promised state expansion during the campaign, but once elected they abandoned their supporters by advocating pro-market policies (Acuña and Smith 1994).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Mandates, Powers, and Policies

Johnson

Crisp

2003

American J Political Sci

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Elections provide a mandate to pursue a set of policies. Party label provides a concise ideological cue for voters to choose among candidates, and research on industrial democracies verifies a link between the parties voters elect and subsequent policy outcomes. The combination of inchoate party systems and economic vulnerability elsewhere may weaken the link between voter choice and policy. When examining economic policies in Latin America, there is some controversy as to whether governments carried out "reform by surprise"-promising one thing during a campaign while implementing another in office. We test whether the ideological reputations of executives' and legislators' parties explain whether they adopt marketoriented policies. We find that the future behavior of presidential candidates is difficult for voters to predict. However, the ideological reputation of legislators is a reliable predictor of policy outcomes, and the relationship is clarified by the prospects of collective action by legislative delegations.

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Section: Voters' Preferences Ideological Reputations and Electoral mentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Electoral Mandates and Institutional Powersmentioning

confidence: 98%

mentioning

confidence: 95%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Mandates, Powers, and Policies

Johnson

Crisp

2003

American J Political Sci

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“…En Perú el autogolpe del presidente Fujimori fue apoyado por un amplio segmento 12 de la población que lo vio como respuesta al convulso contexto de violencia y estancamiento económico que vivía el país (Conaghan, 1996). A pesar de que el golpe de Estado en Honduras lo rechazó más de la mitad de los ciudadanos de este país, un año antes la preferencia por un golpe se instalaba en un 56 % (Booth y Seligson, 2009).…”

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La Defensa Colectiva De La Democracia en América Latina: ¿por Qué?, ¿cómo?, ¿cuándo?

González

Liendo

2017

Anal. político

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RESUMENEste artículo explora los factores que incentivan a las organizaciones regionales a sancionar países que experimentan retrocesos autoritarios en su proceso político. Tomando como caso de estudio las respuestas diplomáticas de la Organización de los Estados Americanos a nueve crisis políticas entre 1990 y 2017, el documento profundiza en las variables determinantes que han permitido la aplicación y efectividad de los distintos mecanismos de protección de la democracia en el hemisferio. El artículo formula tres aportes. Primero, que a mayor número de países democráticos al interior de la Organización, más probable es la aplicación de las sanciones. Segundo, que una conducta multilateral de Estados Unidos es mucho más efectiva que la conducta unilateral para restaurar la democracia. Tercero, que los países con coaliciones de golpe sólidas harán menos efectivas las sanciones.Palabras clave: Organización de los Estados Americanos, defensa de la democracia, multilateralismo, política exterior de Estados Unidos, América Latina. COLLECTIVE DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: WHY, HOW, WHEN ABSTRACTThis article explores the factors that encourage regional organizations to sanction countries experiencing authoritarian setbacks in their political processes. Using Organization of American States diplomatic responses to nine political crises between 1990 and 2017 as a case study, this article delves into the determinative variables that have permitted application of mechanisms for the hemispheric protection of democracy and rendered them effective. The article posits three determinative factors: first, that the greater the number of democratic countries within the Organization, the more likely it is that sanctions will be applied; second, that multilateral action by the United States is far more effective than unilateral conduct in restoring democracy; and, third, that countries with strong pro-coup coalitions will make sanctions less effective.

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Impeachment in Latin America

Palamone

2023

Presidential Impeachment in Latin America

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A deficit of democratic authenticity: Political linkage and the public in Andean polities

Cited by 19 publications

References 5 publications

Mandates, Powers, and Policies

Mandates, Powers, and Policies

La Defensa Colectiva De La Democracia en América Latina: ¿por Qué?, ¿cómo?, ¿cuándo?

Impeachment in Latin America

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