A Developmental Perspective on Moral Emotions

Malti, Tina; Dys, Sebastian P.

doi:10.1007/s11245-013-9224-5

Cited by 22 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…We are not aware of any developmental studies that have directly examined interpersonal regret per se. However, there is a considerable body of research on the development of guilt (e.g., Barrett, Zahn-Waxler, & Cole, 1993;Bybee, 1998;Ferguson, Stegge, Miller, & Olsen, 1999;Malti, 2016;Malti & Dys, 2015;Tangney, Wagner, Hill-Barlow, Marschall, & Gramzow, 1996). Behavioral studies of guilt in younger children have typically used a mishap paradigm, in which young children cause accidental damage to an object and their behavioral and affective responses to the situation are measured.…”

Section: The Development Of Guiltmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Developmental changes in children's performance on this task are widely interpreted as reflecting developmental changes in the ability to anticipate guilt (Malti, 2016;Malti & Dys, 2015;Malti, Gummerum, Keller, & Buchmann, 2009), with the emergence of this anticipatory ability assumed to have an effect on children's moral and prosocial choices (Malti, 2016;Ongley & Malti, 2014). We note that it is at least possible that this task taps into the ability to anticipate regret (with its counterfactual component) as well as guilt; establishing this would require a more fine-tuned methodology that establishes the nature of the negative emotions that children predict.…”

Section: The Development Of Guiltmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Becoming Kinder: Prosocial Choice and the Development of Interpersonal Regret

Uprichard

McCormack

2018

Child Development

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Three experiments examined children's ability to feel regret following a failure to act prosocially. In Experiment 1, ninety 6- to 7-year-olds and one hundred seven 7- to 9-year-olds were given a choice to donate a resource to another child. If they failed to donate, they discovered that this meant the other child could not win a prize. Children in both age groups then showed evidence of experiencing regret, although not in control conditions where they had not made the choice themselves or their choice did not negatively affect the other child. In Experiment 2, eighty-five 5- to 6-year-olds and one hundred nine 7- to 9-year-olds completed the same task; only the older group showed evidence of regret. In Experiment 3, with one hundred thirty-four 6- to 7-year-olds, experiencing regret was associated with subsequently making other prosocial choices.

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Section: The Development Of Guiltmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Development Of Guiltmentioning

confidence: 99%

Becoming Kinder: Prosocial Choice and the Development of Interpersonal Regret

Uprichard

McCormack

2018

Child Development

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“…After discussing all kinds of all‐too‐human emotions involved in moral development, such as fear, disappointment, prospective shame and remorse, I doubt whether Aristotle's ideal, which described things always with respect to their true or most fully realised form, can ever be exemplified by anyone (cf. Malti and Dys, ). Being virtuous, i.e.…”

Section: Proper Virtuementioning

confidence: 99%

An Aristotelian Model of Moral Development

Sanderse¹

2014

Journal of Philosophy of Education

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Despite the Aristotelian renaissance in the philosophy of education, the development of virtue has not received much attention. This is unfortunate, because an attempt to draft an Aristotelian model of moral development can help philosophers to evaluate the contribution Aristotelian virtue ethics can make to our understanding of moral development, provide psychologists with a potentially richer account of morality and its development, and help educators to understand the developmental phase people are in. In the article, it is argued that the Aristotelian categories of the ‘morally indifferent’, ‘un‐self‐controlled’, ‘self‐controlled’ and ‘properly virtuous’ can be interpreted as the successive stages or levels of a comprehensive developmental model. For each stage, it will be made clear whether people are committed to virtue, whether they act virtuously or not, whether they act with pleasure or pain, and which desires and reasons they have for acting. The article closes with suggestions about what needs to be done if the proposed Aristotelian account of moral development is to become psychologically more realistic and educationally useful.

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“…Emotions provide important information about how adolescents interpret the affective consequences of decisions taken in moral-conflict situation (Malti & Latzko, 2012). Hypothetical moral dilemmas scenarios are used as a way to trigger emotions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Moral Emotion of Adolescents in the Context of Decision-Making

Pratiwi¹,

Subandi²,

Adiyanti³

2019

Proceedings of the 4th ASEAN Conference on Psychology, Counselling, and Humanities (ACPCH 2018)

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Adolescents need to have moral emotions as an effort to make moral decisions and anticipate the emergence of moral transgression. The moral emotions as those emotions that are linked to the interests or welfare either of society as a whole or at least of persons other than the judge or agent. Some people believe that making the morally right decision makes people feel good. However, not many studies in Indonesia have supported this statement. This study aims to find out the moral emotions that appear in the context of hypothetical moral dilemmas and the patterns of responses to hypothetical moral dilemmas. Methods: Participants were 852 adolescents living in Semarang, aged 11 to 16 years old. Data were collected using a questionnaire survey of hypothetical moral dilemmas with Malti's and Buchmann's instruments. Results. A descriptive analysis of the results showed that there were three forms of moral emotions: positive (i.e., happy, pride, calm, gratitude, sincere, sympathy, and not feeling guilty), negative (i.e., pity, shame, regret, guilty, anxious or worry, and emotional conflicts (there are positive and negative feelings), confuse, and bad feelings) and neutral (neither feeling good or bad). The patterns found in adolescents were 57. 2% happy moralist, 26.5% unhappy moralist; 5.9% happy victimizer; 3.6% unhappy victimizer; 5.4% pattern can not be categorized based on moral decisions; and 1,4% can not be categorized based on existing patterns based on selfish decisions. Conclusion. Overall, this study demonstrates that moral emotions develop during adolescence. Moral emotions can function during daily moral decision-making processes

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A Developmental Perspective on Moral Emotions

Cited by 22 publications

References 40 publications

Becoming Kinder: Prosocial Choice and the Development of Interpersonal Regret

Becoming Kinder: Prosocial Choice and the Development of Interpersonal Regret

An Aristotelian Model of Moral Development

Moral Emotion of Adolescents in the Context of Decision-Making

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