A Disconnect in Representation? Comparison of Trends in Congressional and Public Polarization

Abstract

While it is widely agreed that Congress has polarized over the past 40 years, there is considerable disagreement about the extent of public polarization and its connection to congressional polarization. We present the first estimation of time series of polarization using the same method on the most comprehensive data for both the public and the Senate. With statistics of various definitions of polarization, we find little increase in the dispersion of views in the public from 1956 to 2012, but do find an increase in ideological sorting starting around 1980. The two time series bear little resemblance to one another with respect to divergence. Further, while congressional sorting exceeds that in the public today, we find that Congress has always been unrepresentative of the public. These results suggest that it is unlikely that changes in public preferences alone explain the widening gulf between the two parties in Congress.

On the Meaning of Survey Reports of Roll‐Call “Votes”

“…These results are in keeping with the broader literature on survey design that shows responses to survey questions vary considerably in their reliability, stability, and validity (e.g., Groves et al 2009;Zaller and Feldman 1992). This measurement error would have the consequence of making voters appear more centrist (less partisan) than the better-measured preferences of members of legislatures and create a disconnect in representation, exactly as much of the existing literature finds (Bafumi and Herron 2010;Hill and Tausanovitch 2015). The survey design literature generally recommends careful investigation of any survey item to evaluate its value for measuring underlying constructs.…”

“…It is generally accepted that members of the House and Senate have polarized more than their constituents (e.g., Hill and Tausanovitch 2015;McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006). Almost all comparisons, however, rely on the survey responses of citizens without contextual or policy-specific information.…”

“…3 Suppose, for example, that survey respondents with less information were less likely to "vote" with their party because they did not understand the issue at stake, reducing the correlation between partisanship and measured preferences. This measurement error would have the consequence of making voters appear more centrist (less partisan) than the better-measured preferences of members of legislatures and create a disconnect in representation, exactly as much of the existing literature finds (Bafumi and Herron 2010;Hill and Tausanovitch 2015).…”

Principled Moderation: Understanding Parties’ Support of Moderate Candidates

“…However, while parties are more likely to support candidates who are significantly more moderate than their competitors, this is not the case in primaries that lead to competitive general elections. In addition, I also show that party preferences have shifted over time ‐ even when national preferences have remained relatively constant (Hill and Tausanovitch )—perhaps reflecting changes in the preferences of party elites connected to the party. Combined, these findings suggest that party preferences for moderate candidates are not strategic attempts to win elections.…”

“…In the past few years, candidates have increasingly taken on more extreme ideological positions. The median voter, however, has not changed substantially over the same time period (Hill and Tausanovitch ). If party support is strategically aimed at supporting candidates with the greatest general election appeal, we should expect relative ideological consistency across time for party‐supported candidates.…”