A Divided Government, an Ideological Parliament, and an Insecure Leader: Turkey's Indecision about Joining the Iraq War*

Abstract

Objectives On March 1, 2003, the Turkish parliament rejected a government motion that would involve Turkey in the Iraq war and allow U.S. forces to use Turkish territory in an offensive against Iraq. This decision has been considered as a significant departure from traditional Western‐oriented Turkish foreign policy. We investigate the reasons behind this rather unexpected foreign policy decision. Method To systematically examine the decision‐making process and the outcome, we utilize the “decision‐units framework.” We present primary and secondary evidence from government and media sources and utilize interviews conducted with some of the high‐level decisionmakers that were involved in decision making at the time. This article combines traditional methodological tools, such as elite interviews and process tracing, with novel approaches in foreign policy analysis studies. Results The nature of the decision‐unit, decision‐making rules, the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the AKP (Adalet and Kalkinma Partisi—Justice and Development Party) leadership, and the absence of a strong and decisive leader shaped the outcome. Conclusion The Turkish parliament's decision on its role in the Iraq war is an interesting and informative case for foreign policy studies. It challenges the conventional wisdom on parliamentary influence in foreign policy making in parliamentary regimes. Under certain circumstances—even when a single‐party enjoys parliamentary majority—parliaments can be major players in foreign policy decision making.

Beklenti Teorisinin Dış Politikadaki Uygulamaları Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme

“…Farklı aktörlerin farklı kararlar alabildiği konusundaki diğer bir önemli örnek Türkiye'nin 2003'teki Irak Savaşı'na katılmayı reddetmesidir. Dönemin hükümeti Irak'a asker gönderilmesi hususunda ABD'ye katılma konusunda karar verse de, meclis hükümetin bu kararını onaylamamıştır (Brown, 2007;Taydaş ve Özdamar, 2013).…”

Turkish Foreign Policy and the Role of the TGNA: Cases of Syria (and Iraq) Motions

“…In this case, the TGNA refused to ratify the Cabinet's decision to permit the United States to use Turkey as a base for its Northern front as part of the U.S. intervention into Iraq (Kesgin & Kaarbo, 2010, p. 19). Taydaş andÖ zdamar (2012) andÖ ztop (2015) analyze Turkey's indecisiveness to join the Iraq War utilizing the "decision units framework". Despite the work on this topic, no further study about executive-legislative relations has been made on Turkey's recent important foreign policy decisions in which the ratification of the TGNA is required according to the Constitutional prerogatives.…”

Prime minister leadership style and the role of parliament in security policy

“…The vote was influenced by the leadership’s inconsistency and poor management skills. So confident that their preference would prevail, the leaders did not enforce party discipline (Çuhadar et al, 2017a; Kesgin and Kaarbo, 2010; Robins, 2003; Taydaş and Özdamar, 2013). This outcome was in stark contrast to the Turkish parliament’s approval of the deployment of troops in the 1991 Gulf War.…”

“…Özal was very much involved, dominating parliamentary deliberations, and he effectively managed the process to secure his preferred outcome. Erdoğan, on the other hand, remained in the background during parliamentary processes and poorly managed the process, so confident he was that parliament would support his position (Çuhadar et al, 2017a; Kesgin and Kaarbo, 2010; Robins, 2003; Taydaş and Özdamar, 2013). Çuhadar et al (2017a) attribute these different processes and outcomes to the differences in the leaders’ personalities and styles.…”