A Dual Aspect Theory of Shared Intention

Abstract

In this article I propose an original view of the nature of shared intention. In contrast to psychological views (Bratman, Searle, Tuomela) and normative views (Gilbert), I argue that both functional roles played by attitudes of individual participants and interpersonal obligations are factors of central and independent significance for explaining what shared intention is. It is widely agreed that shared intention (I) normally motivates participants to act, and (II) normally creates obligations between them. I argue that the view I propose can explain why it is not a mere accident that both (I) and (II) are true of shared intention, while psychological and normative views cannot. The basic idea is that shared intention involves a structure of attitudes of individuals – including, most importantly, attitudes of reliance – which normally plays the relevant motivating roles and creates the relevant obligations.

Robot Rights in Joint Action

“…5 Many authors distinguish between ambiguous terms with more than one unrelated meaning and polysemy, which involves several associated or related meanings (cf., Löhr, 2021 for an overview). 6 Authors who have recently discussed such commitments and entitlements are Clark, 2006;Gilbert, 2013;Bratman, 2013;Tuomela, 2013, Roth, 2017Geurts, 2019;Alonso, 2016;Rachar, 2021. I build on these authors here but diverge from them substantially.…”

Shared Agency Without Shared Intention

“…4).18 This may be part of what normativists and constructivists disagree about. Compare(Alonso, 2016).19 See(Bratman, 1987), which I follow in this section.…”

“…5-6;Tuomela, 2009). For attempts to model shared agency in broadly game-theoretic terms, see, e.g., 5 A sample of influential versions of intention constructivism would be:(Alonso, 2016;Bratman, 2014;Kutz, 2000;McMahon, 2005;Miller, 2004;Searle, 1990;Tuomela, 2005;Velleman, 2000).6 As at, e.g.,(Bratman, 2014, p. 29).…”

Intending, Settling, and Relying

“…And I have myself pursued a similar strategy in developing an alternative view of the nature of shared intention (Alonso 2009(Alonso , 2016b. I also think that the general structure of Bratman's response to Velleman's incoherence challenge is along the right lines.…”