A Dynamic Model for International Environmental Agreements

Breton, Michèle; Sbragia, Lucia; Zaccour, Georges

doi:10.1007/s10640-009-9304-6

Cited by 109 publications

(95 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…As in [13], the current paper looks at a situation where we have N symmetrical countries that decide whether or not they want to become a "signatory" of an IEA for the reduction of pollution. The set of signatory countries is denoted by S and the members of S maximize their aggregate welfare, where s is the number of signatory countries, S s = , 0 s ≥ .…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For simplicity reasons and to better compare with [13], environmental damages are linear in the amount of emissions released by all the countries.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In [13], all signatory countries agree to inflict a punishment to all non-signatory countries, and it is assumed to be proportional to the level of the pollution stock.…”

Section: Punishment Functionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…[13] looked at the evolution of signatories to an IEA on climate change. They developed a punishment structure imposed by signatories on to deviators which was linked to the number of signatories and the level of the pollution stock.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The purpose of this short essay is to expand on [13] by looking at the implications of introducing relative emissions, which gives it more of a BTA flavour.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Climate Coalitions and Punishments

Eyland¹

2017

TEL

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Studies that demonstrate that climate change is human induced are becoming more and more prevalent. Even though most world leaders are aware of this urgency and know that we must work at mitigating it quickly, little has been accomplished in terms of widespread participation in an International Environmental Agreement (IEA). The purpose of this paper is to create a link between studies on the use of border tax adjustments (BTAs) and coalition formation. The main contribution is that the punishment will be based on relative emissions between signatories and defectors. It is a structure that is more likely be accepted by the World Trade Organization (WTO) since it may be seen as fair due to the fact that if signatories and defectors emit the same amount of pollution then there will be no punishment. The main results indicate that this form of punishment may lead to small, partial, or full cooperation, depending on the parameter values. Additionally, at any equilibrium level, the signatories have a punishment structure that induces defectors to reduce their emissions by the same amount. In the end, this punishment may be seen as a credible threat because at equilibrium no punishment is imposed, yet if we remove the possibility of punishment it breaks down to a situation wherein no large coalitions are feasible.

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Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For simplicity reasons and to better compare with [13], environmental damages are linear in the amount of emissions released by all the countries.…”

Section: The Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In [13], all signatory countries agree to inflict a punishment to all non-signatory countries, and it is assumed to be proportional to the level of the pollution stock.…”

Section: Punishment Functionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The purpose of this short essay is to expand on [13] by looking at the implications of introducing relative emissions, which gives it more of a BTA flavour.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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