A Fair and Secure Reverse Auction for Government Procurement

Abstract

With the development of e-commerce, the electronic auction is attracting the attention of many people. Many Internet companies, such as eBay and Yahoo!, have launched online auction systems. Many researchers have studied the security problems of electronic auction systems, but few of them are multi-attribute-based. In 2014, Shi proposed a provable secure, sealed-bid, and multi-attribute auction protocol based on the semi-honest model. We evaluated this protocol and found that it has some design weaknesses and is vulnerable to the illegal operations of buyers, which results in unfairness. In this paper, we improved this protocol by replacing the Paillier’s cryptosystem with the elliptic curve discrete (ECC), and we designed a novel, online, and multi-attribute reverse-auction system using the semi-honest model. In our system, sellers’ identities are not revealed to the buyers, and the buyers cannot conduct illegal operations that may compromise the fairness of the auction.

A Secure Three-Factor Anonymous User Authentication Scheme for Internet of Things Environments

“…Anonymous communication is designed from physical layer to application layer. Various applications and technologies are designed to meet the goal [1][2][3][4][5][6].…”

An enhanced approach for solving winner determination problem in reverse combinatorial auctions

“…The roles of auctioneers and bidders in the reverse combinatorial auction are exchanged. According to [10], reverse combinatorial auctions are widely used in procurement, where the auctioneer wants to gain the tasks with minimum possible cost from an appropriate set of bidders to perform the corresponding tasks [11]. The auctioneer can hold a reverse auction to try to obtain the tasks, more formally, the WDP in a reverse combinatorial auction finds winning bids that minimize the auctioneer's revenue under the same constraints.…”