Traditionally, research focusing on the design of routing and staffing policies for service systems has modeled servers as having fixed (possibly heterogeneous) service rates. However, service systems are generally staffed by people who respond to workload incentives; that is, how hard a person works can depend both on how much work there is, and how the work is divided between the people responsible for it. In a service system, the routing and staffing policies control such workload incentives, and so they impact the rate at which servers work. We investigate the consequences of this observation when modeling service system performance in the context of the M /M /N queue, which is the canonical model for large service systems. We begin by presenting a model for "strategic" servers that choose their service rate, in which there is a tradeoff between an "effort cost" and a "value of idleness": faster service rates require more exertion of effort, but also lead to more idle time.Next, we initiate the study of staffing strategic servers. There is a large literature focusing on staffing decisions in the classical, non-strategic, setting, where the optimal policy is well understood. In particular, the minimum number of servers that must be staffed to ensure stability in a conventional M /M /N queue is the offered load. Meanwhile (assuming linear staffing and waiting costs), it is economically optimal to staff square-root-of-the-offered-load servers in excess of this minimum, which coincides with the limiting regime often referred to as the Quality and Efficiency Driven (QED) regime: the system is efficient because the system loading factor is close to one, and maintains quality of service because wait times are small. In the presence of strategic servers, the offered load depends on the arrival rate, the staffing, and the routing, through the servers' choice of their service rates. We show that an analogous A full version of this paper is available at: http://arxiv.org/abs/1402.