In his "A Fallacy in Potentiality" Don Berkich (2007) provides a thorough and thought-provoking assessment of the so-called "Trajectory Argument" against abortion, presenting an objection that he believes is effective against every form of it seen thus far. After reviewing the argument itself and Berkich's objection, I provide a counter-objection arising from the ontology of dispositions, one which shows that the Trajectory Argument holds its own against Berkich's critique. The basic idea of the Trajectory Argument is that because a conceptus 1 has the potential to develop into an adult human being, it is wrong to destroy the conceptus for any reason, unless that reason would also justify the destruction of an adult human being. The conceptus is the opening point of a causal trajectory that will, if left to develop normally, likely result in a person; this grants it a high moral status. The argument is designed to capture what some take to be a strong intuition that no one would want the conceptus that became him or her to have been destroyed, and so it is prima facie wrong to destroy other concepti. Thus it is presumed to speak against the general moral permissibility of abortion, and