2015 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS) 2015
DOI: 10.1109/cns.2015.7346867
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A firewall algebra for OpenStack

Abstract: An algebra is proposed for constructing and reasoning about anomaly-free firewall policies. Based on the notion of refinement as safe replacement, the algebra provides operators for sequential composition, union and intersection of policies. The algebra is used to provide a uniform way to specify and reason about OpenStack host-based and network access controls, in particular, security group and perimeter firewall policies.

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Cited by 13 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…Congress [41] is an OpenStack project offering similar features as Weatherman. Foley et al [47] propose an algebra for anomaly-free firewall policies for Open-Stack. Many state-based formal models (e.g., [40,[48][49][50]) are proposed for program monitoring.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Congress [41] is an OpenStack project offering similar features as Weatherman. Foley et al [47] propose an algebra for anomaly-free firewall policies for Open-Stack. Many state-based formal models (e.g., [40,[48][49][50]) are proposed for program monitoring.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, the time elapsed before reverting the operation can be critical to perform some illicit actions, for instance, transferring sensitive files before loosing the assigned role. Foley et al [31] provide an algebra to assess the effect of security policies replacement and composition in OpenStack. Their solution can be considered as a proactive approach for checking operational properties violations, whereas our work targets the runtime verification of structural security property violations.…”
Section: Cloud Security Auditingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Our work differs, in that policy composition under the , and o 9 operators defined in this paper all result in anomaly-free policies. In earlier work [22], we developed the algebra FW 0 , and used it to reason over host-based and network access controls in OpenStack. In the FW 0 algebra, we focused on stateless firewall policies that are defined in terms of constraints on individual IPs, ports and protocols.…”
Section: Table 18mentioning
confidence: 99%