A Formal Framework for Modelling Coercion Resistance and Receipt Freeness

Heather, James; Schneider, Steve

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-32759-9_19

Cited by 11 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…FDR furthermore cannot verify non-interactive zero knowledge proofs unlike ProVerif. Similarly, a typical voting system requirement, coercionresistance, can be defined in CSP [15], but FDR does not support its mechanical verification. ProVerif can verify this property but we did not make it a focus of our verification efforts.…”

Section: Expressivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Verification of STAR-Vote and Evaluation of FDR and ProVerif

Moran

Wallach

2017

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. We present the first automated privacy analysis of STARVote, a real world voting system design with sophisticated "end-to-end" cryptography, using FDR and ProVerif. We also evaluate the effectiveness of these tools. Despite the complexity of the voting system, we were able to verify that our abstracted formal model of STAR-Vote provides ballot-secrecy using both formal approaches. Notably, ProVerif is radically faster than FDR, making it more suitable for rapid iteration and refinement of the formal model.

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Section: Expressivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Verification of STAR-Vote and Evaluation of FDR and ProVerif

Moran

Wallach

2017

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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“…Similarly, the symbolic definition of receipt-freeness in [26] also requires the voter to adopt a strategy to fool the adversary. Other definitions in symbolic models aim at characterizing the notion of a receipt [14,33,36] but (as usual in symbolic models) they are much more abstract than standard computational models.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

BeleniosRF

Chaidos

Cortier

Fuchsbauer

et al. 2016

Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security

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We propose a new voting scheme, BeleniosRF, that offers both receipt-freeness and end-to-end verifiability. It is receipt-free in a strong sense, meaning that even dishonest voters cannot prove how they voted. We provide a game-based definition of receipt-freeness for voting protocols with non-interactive ballot casting, which we name strong receipt-freeness (sRF). To our knowledge, sRF is the first game-based definition of receipt-freeness in the literature, and it has the merit of being particularly concise and simple. Built upon the Helios protocol, BeleniosRF inherits its simplicity and does not require any anti-coercion strategy from the voters. We implement BeleniosRF and show its feasibility on a number of platforms, including desktop computers and smartphones. 1 After successful authentication between the voter and the ballot box, ballot casting is non-interactive.

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“…[7] provided formal definitions of various privacy notions in applied pi calculus, and showed how they are related to each other. Finally, [10] used CSP to fit a wide range of definitions and properties given in the literature for coercion-resistance.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Preventing Coercion in E-Voting: Be Open and Commit

Jamroga

Tabatabaei

2017

Electronic Voting

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We present a game-theoretic approach to coercion-resistance from the point of view of an honest election authority that chooses between various protection methods with different levels of resistance and different implementation costs. We give a simple game model of the election and propose a preliminary analysis. It turns out that, in the games that we look at, Stackelberg equilibrium for the society does not coincide with maxmin, and it is always more attractive to the society than Nash equilibrium. This suggests that the society is better off if the security policy is publicly announced, and the authorities commit to it. 3 The definition was game-based in the technical sense, i.e., the security property was defined as the outcome of an abstract game between the "verifier" and the "adversary". In this paper, we use game models to study the interaction between the actual participants of the protocol.

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A Formal Framework for Modelling Coercion Resistance and Receipt Freeness

Cited by 11 publications

References 15 publications

Verification of STAR-Vote and Evaluation of FDR and ProVerif

Verification of STAR-Vote and Evaluation of FDR and ProVerif

BeleniosRF

Preventing Coercion in E-Voting: Be Open and Commit

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