A Formal Model of Identity Mixer

Camenisch, Jan; Mödersheim, Sebastian; Sommer, Dieter

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-15898-8_13

Cited by 36 publications

(40 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…When a user makes an anonymous authentication request, she proves to a verifier that she has obtained a valid credential (CL signature [26]) from the central authority. Lastly, Camenisch et al proposed an identity mixer scheme [27], [28] in which users need to obtain a credential for their attributes. To access a service, a user proves to the service verifier that she has the required attributes.…”

Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In all these schemes [24], [25], [27]- [29], authentication is not bound to a particular verifier, whereas in our scheme an authentication tag can only be verified by a designated verifier. Furthermore, k-TAA schemes allow verifiers to de-anonymise a user's identity when she has authenticated more than k times, while in our scheme a service verifier can detect whether a user has used the tag (double spending) but cannot de-anonymise a user's identity.…”

Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Anonymous Single Sign-On With Proxy Re-Verification

Han

Chen

Schneider

et al. 2020

IEEE Trans.Inform.Forensic Secur.

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An anonymous Single Sign-on (ASSO) scheme allows users to access multiple services anonymously using one credential. We propose a new ASSO scheme, where users can access services anonymously through the use of anonymous credentials and unlinkably through the provision of designated verifiers. Notably, verifiers cannot link a user's service requests even if they collude. The novelty is that when a designated verifier is unavailable, a central authority can authorise new verifiers to authenticate the user on behalf of the original verifier. Furthermore, a central verifier can also be authorised to deanonymise users and trace their service requests. We formalise the scheme along with a security proof and provide an empirical evaluation of its performance. This scheme can be applied to smart ticketing where minimising the collection of personal information of users is increasingly important to transport organisations due to privacy regulations such as General Data Protection Regulations (GDPR).

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Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anonymous Single Sign-On With Proxy Re-Verification

Han

Chen

Schneider

et al. 2020

IEEE Trans.Inform.Forensic Secur.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…They offered an optional approach to trace the identity of the pseudonymous token for some transactions. After that, some practical systems like IBM's Identity Mixer [8], ABC4Trust [30] started to consider the anonymity revocation. An interesting revocation approach is traceable anonymous certificate [22].…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Auditable Credential Anonymity Revocation Based on Privacy-Preserving Smart Contracts

Galindo

Wang

2019

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Anonymity revocation is an essential component of credential issuing systems since unconditional anonymity is incompatible with pursuing and sanctioning credential misuse. However, current anonymity revocation approaches have shortcomings with respect to the auditability of the revocation process. In this paper, we propose a novel anonymity revocation approach based on privacy-preserving blockchain-based smart contracts, where the code self-execution property ensures availability and public ledger immutability provides auditability. We describe an instantiation of this approach, provide an implementation thereof and conduct a series of evaluations in terms of running time, gas cost and latency. The results show that our scheme is feasible and efficient.

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“…This is due to the fact that (as the security of security protocols is not guaranteed only by encryption schemes) the security of web applications is not guaranteed only by store procedures or perfect random generation of token. Another example has been presented in [11], where authors search for attacks in zero-knowledge proof systems abstracting away some of the mathematical and implementation details of the zero-knowledge algorithms.…”

Section: Modeling Systems and Communicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

CPDY: Extending the Dolev-Yao Attacker with Physical-Layer Interactions

Rocchetto

Tippenhauer

2016

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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We propose extensions to the Dolev-Yao attacker model to make it suitable for arguments about security of Cyber-Physical Systems. The Dolev-Yao attacker model uses a set of rules to define potential actions by an attacker with respect to messages (i.e. information) exchanged between parties during a protocol execution. As the traditional Dolev-Yao model considers only information (exchanged over a channel controlled by the attacker), the model cannot directly be used to argue about the security of cyber-physical systems where physical-layer interactions are possible. Our Dolev-Yao extension, called cyber-physical Dolev-Yao (CPDY) attacker model, allows additional orthogonal interaction channels between the parties. In particular, such orthogonal channels can be used to model physical-layer mechanical, chemical, or electrical interactions between components. In addition, we discuss the inclusion of physical properties such as location or distance in the rule set. We present an example set of additional rules for the Dolev-Yao attacker, using those we are able to formally discover physical attacks that previously could only be found by empirical methods or detailed physical process models.

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A Formal Model of Identity Mixer

Cited by 36 publications

References 26 publications

Anonymous Single Sign-On With Proxy Re-Verification

Anonymous Single Sign-On With Proxy Re-Verification

Auditable Credential Anonymity Revocation Based on Privacy-Preserving Smart Contracts

CPDY: Extending the Dolev-Yao Attacker with Physical-Layer Interactions

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