A Forward Privacy Model for RFID Authentication Protocols

Abstract

Abstract. In this paper, we propose a new variant of indistinguishabilitybased security model for the RFID authentication protocol, which allows an adversary to obtain an authentication result and secret key of a target tag. Ng et al. showed that symmetric-key based RFID authentication protocols cannot be resilient to the above information leakage simultaneously in the Paise-Vaudenay security model. We review the existing result and extend the Juels-Weis security model to satisfy these properties by using a suitable restriction. Moreover, we give two example protocols that satisfy the modified security model.

A new unpredictability‐based radio frequency identification forward privacy model and a provably secure construction

“…In order to preserve the privacy of RFID authentication systems, many privacy models have been formalized in the literature, for example, . Among them, there are five main categories, indistinguishability‐based models , unpredictability‐based models , simulation‐based models , universal composability‐based models , and zero‐knowledge‐based models . These privacy models have captured strong adversarial capabilities regarding tag anonymity and untraceability.…”

“…These privacy models have captured strong adversarial capabilities regarding tag anonymity and untraceability. And some of them consider forward privacy as well . We will give a detailed review of these forward privacy models in Related work (Section 1.1).…”

“…And Moriyama et al . proposed a new variant of indistinguishability‐based forward privacy model for RFID authentication protocols in 2013 . However, as mentioned before, it is difficult to prove a concrete protocol to be ind‐private .…”