A foundation for presentism

Abstract

Presentism states that everything is present. Crucial to our understanding of this thesis is how we interpret the 'is'. Recently, several philosophers have claimed that on any interpretation presentism comes out as either trivially true or manifestly false. Yet, presentism is meant to be a substantive and interesting thesis. I outline in detail the nature of the problem and the standard interpretative options. After unfavourably assessing several popular responses in the literature, I offer an alternative interpretation that provides the desired result. This interpretation is then used to clarify the distinction between 'real change' from mere variation and temporal relativisation. Reflecting on my solution, I try to diagnose the source of confusion over these issues. Then, building upon Fine's (Modality and tense, 2005) distinction between ontic and factive presentism, I elucidate what the presentist thesis specifically concerns and how best to formalise it. In the process I distinguish a weak and strong (extended) version of the presentist thesis. Finally, I end by drawing out some limitations of the paper.

Memoro Ergo Sum

“…To support the reader, we list here a few references, which investigate the ontological and logical aspects of this interpretation, such as Refs. [29], [30], [31] [32], [33], [34], [35], [31], [36], [37], [38], [39] and [40].…”

Tensed Facts and the Fittingness of our Attitudes1

“…See Deng (2013), Leininger (2021) and Oaklander (2012). 7 For explication and defense of presentist versions of the A-theory see Deasy (2017), Ingram (2016), Pezet (2017), Tallant (2012), Crisp (2003), Bourne (2006). 8 For explication and defense of variants of the growing block view see Rosenkranz andCorreia (2018), Forbes (2016), Forbes andBriggs (2017), Tooley (1997), Forrest (2006), Button (2007).…”

“…77For explication and defense of presentist versions of the A‐theory see Deasy (2017), Ingram (2016), Pezet (2017), Tallant (2012), Crisp (2003), Bourne (2006). …”

Persistence

“…44 For discussion of this issue, see Parsons (2000) and Miller (2009). 45 For explication and defence of presentist versions of the A-theory, see Crisp (2003); Bourne (2006); Tallant (2012); Ingram (2016Ingram ( , 2019; (Paoletti (2016); Deasy (2017);and Pezet (2017). 46 Defenders of this way of responding to the problem of temporary intrinsics include Merricks (1994Merricks ( , 1999 and Pezet (2019).…”