Russia's Oil and Natural Gas 2006
DOI: 10.7135/upo9781843317555.010
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A Frozen Venezuela? The Resource Curse and Russian Politics

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Cited by 10 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…15 To these factors we must add other considerations, more political than economic. In this sense, the most far-reaching criticism has been that expressed by authors such as Tompson (2006), who suspects that energy policy is nothing more than a set of jumbled decisions, with no strategic sense, beneath which lies a struggle for political and economic power between the old Yel'tsin elite (built up through the financial sector) and the new Putin elite (of administrative origin). Even more critical of this policy are those who argue that the state's direct involvement in organising the sector will lead to inefficiency in resource management and a lack of incentives for investments guided by the search for firm profitability (Milov et al 2006, p. 307).…”
Section: New Drivers For Investmentsmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…15 To these factors we must add other considerations, more political than economic. In this sense, the most far-reaching criticism has been that expressed by authors such as Tompson (2006), who suspects that energy policy is nothing more than a set of jumbled decisions, with no strategic sense, beneath which lies a struggle for political and economic power between the old Yel'tsin elite (built up through the financial sector) and the new Putin elite (of administrative origin). Even more critical of this policy are those who argue that the state's direct involvement in organising the sector will lead to inefficiency in resource management and a lack of incentives for investments guided by the search for firm profitability (Milov et al 2006, p. 307).…”
Section: New Drivers For Investmentsmentioning
confidence: 96%
“…The existing record testifies to the contrary. In recent years the rentier state theory, besides the Middle East region, has been applied to other areas of the world, including sub-Saharan Africa (Yates 1996;Clark 1997;Frynas 2004; Soares de Oliveira 2007a), South America (Karl 1997) and more recently to post-Soviet Central Asia (Ishiyama 2002;Kuru 2002;Franke et al 2009;Ostrowski 2011a) and Russia (Luong 2000;Kim 2003;Rudiger 2005;Goorha 2006;Tompson 2006;Wood 2007). At the same time, existing criticism of resource curse studies and the emergence of state capitalism make clear the need for a new research project that looks much more closely at questions of development in connection to companies that are vital to state capitalism, most importantly, the National Oil Companies and State-Owned Enterprises.…”
Section: The Next Steps For Researchmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This rent-seeking behavior with resulting low GDP growth is a typical symptom of resource-rich countries and generally referred to as ''the resource curse'' (see for example [61]. Although the resource curse tends to be more obvious for non-renewable point resources such as minerals and oil, four factors influencing the magnitude of the ''curse'' suggest that fisheries in general and fishing agreements in specific can be characterized as a case of a resource curse: weak property rights, unstable institutions and the capital-intensive nature of resource extraction [62], as well as the foreign aid character of government fees [63].…”
Section: The Logic Behind Host Countries 0 Contracting Strategiesmentioning
confidence: 99%