We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies with free-disposal (Saijo et al., 1996(Saijo et al., , 1999 where agents have weak/strong intrinsic preferences for honesty (Dutta and Sen, 2012). Firstly, the Walrasian rule is shown to be non-implementable where all agents have weak (but not strong) intrinsic preferences for honesty. Secondly, the class of e¢ cient allocation rules that are implementable is identi…ed provided that at least one agent has strong intrinsic preferences for honesty. Lastly, the Walrasian rule is shown to belong to that class. JEL classi…cation: C72; D71. Key-words: Natural implementation, Nash equilibrium, exchange economies, intrinsic preferences for honesty.We are grateful to Bram Driesen, Hitoshi Matsushima, Hervé Moulin, Hans Peters, Tatsuyoshi Saijo, Arunava Sen, David Wettstein, Nicholas C. Yannelis, for useful comments and suggestions. Special thanks go to exceptionally thorough referees and an advisory editor, whose comments and suggestions have led to substantial improvements in the paper. The usual caveat applies.